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YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED FALL 1983

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Anger in Aristotle's Rhetoric:
An Inquiry Into Politics and Persuasion

by



Darcy Edwin Wudel

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1983

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Anger in Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Inquiry Into Politics and Persuasion" submitted by Darcy Edwin Wudel in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 

To the memory of my father.

The time and effort we in our age devote to the acquisition of knowledge, the men of antiquity, among them men of the highest ability, too, put into a study of form. There have come down to us a great number of speeches which had once served the Greeks and Romans as study models. These demonstrate the deep chasm between the ideals of that age and ours. Even if we ask whether our age can really afford to do without eloquence, the fact is we simply lack the time the Greeks had to devote to this art.

--Jacob Burkhardt

The judge said five to ten--but I say double that again,
I'm not working for the clampdown,
No man born with a living soul,
Can be working for the clampdown,
Kick over the wall, cause governments to fall
How can you refuse it?
Let fury have the hour, anger can be power
D'you know that you can use it?

--The Clash

ABSTRACT

Until recently, the study of the art of rhetoric--the art of persuasive speaking--formed part of the education of men destined for political leadership. Today, as the result of a radical change in the character of higher education, this is no longer the case. The present thesis is an attempt to establish whether this distinctly modern inattention to rhetoric is problematic or not. It proceeds by way of an examination of Aristotle's Rhetoric: a treatise that provides a systematic account of rhetorical practice, but that addresses, as well, theoretical questions regarding the role of persuasion and rhetoric in politics. Following certain hints and suggestions that Aristotle provides for his reader, the examination undertaken focuses on the analyses of the emotions found in the text and focuses, specifically, on anger.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing a thesis would be impossible but for the help one receives along the way. My mother, Peggy, always lent her support. She not only tolerated my filial impiety; she actively encouraged it. Joan Rozak typed my drafts quickly and accurately; moreover, she moved with aplomb to a new and somewhat imposing form of word processing. To my fellow students, Pat Malcolmson, Stuart Munro, Heidi Studer, Keith Morgan, and Diane Lipsett, I owe much. About them, suffice it to say this: they enthusiastically shared their thoughts. But to my teacher and advisor, Leon Craig, I owe my greatest debt. Both his pedagogy and his patience are remarkable.

Table of Contents

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Rhetoric, Political Science, and Aristotle's <u>Rhetoric</u>	1
The Centrality of Emotion in the <u>Rhetoric</u> ...	10
Notes	24
II. ANGER, GOODWILL, AND FRIENDSHIP	27
Anger as a Disposition (1378a30-1379a29)	27
The Objects of Anger (1379a30-1380a5)	40
Mildness	48
A Summary of the Analysis	50
Angry Achilles and the Gods	53
Socrates and the Angry Athenians	62
Anger, Goodwill, and Friendship: A Synthesis	73
Notes	83
III. CONCLUSION	93
Emotion and Politics in the <u>Rhetoric</u>	93
Rhetoric, Political Science, and Aristotle's <u>Rhetoric</u>	98
Notes	103
IV. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	105

I. INTRODUCTION

Rhetoric, Political Science, and Aristotle's Rhetoric

Until comparatively recently, those who sought a higher education sought a liberal education--the study of seven liberal arts: grammar, logic, and rhetoric (the so-called trivium); and arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music (the quadrivium).¹ This was the education of a gentlemanly elite, making them fit to rule other men and capable of employing their leisure for higher pursuits. Such education has all but disappeared. "Higher education" now implies something different.² It is now believed to consist of study in a specialized field of science or social science: economics, zoology, medicine, engineering, or anthropology, to name but a few. This dramatic change is linked decisively to our age's commitment to technical and scientific advance--an advance we are, for the most part, bound to praise. Yet we would be intellectually remiss not to ask whether the disappearance of a liberal education, with its attendant concerns, also deserves our praise. Richard M. Weaver, a man who has asked that question, suggests that this change has left us poorer and suggests, further, that our poverty is most evident when we consider the art of rhetoric.

Our age has witnessed the decline of a number of subjects that once enjoyed prestige and general esteem, but no subject, . . . , has suffered more amazingly in this respect than rhetoric. When one recalls that a century ago rhetoric was regarded as the most important humanistic discipline taught in

our colleges--when one recalls this fact and contrasts it with the very different situation prevailing today--he is forced to see that a great shift of valuation has taken place. In those days, in the not-so-distant Nineteenth Century, to be a professor of rhetoric, one had to be somebody. This was a teaching task that was thought to call for ample and varied resources, and it was recognized as addressing itself to the most important of all ends, the persuading of human beings to adopt right attitudes and act in response to them.³

Indeed, it can be said, with little need for qualification, that today the study of rhetoric--the art of persuasive speaking--stands in low estimation. One might even have to endure ridicule, some good-natured and some not so good-natured, upon suggesting that this study is somehow important. But, as Weaver implies, human beings may, by their very nature, make persuasion and the art of rhetoric necessary. This thesis is an attempt to show that this is, in fact, the case--that men need to be, and should be, persuaded to think and act in certain ways. To put it in concrete political terms, this thesis is an attempt to show that decent political life, in some measure, depends upon politicians' receiving an education in rhetoric and upon political scientists' maintaining an interest in rhetoric.

To begin, we must make some general observations about politics, persuasion, the study of politics, and the present estate of rhetoric. If one looks at or, perhaps more correctly, listens to political life, one realizes that politicians routinely try to persuade. Especially in the liberal-democratic West, persuasion is the very stuff of electioneering and also of the debate that precedes the

enactment of legislation. But these are only the most obvious manifestations of persuasive speech in politics. It occurs everywhere there is politicking: in city council chambers, in boardrooms, and in meetings of many sorts--those of school boards, churches, or university departments. This form of speech is also found in courtrooms. The addresses of lawyers to judges and juries are surely attempts to persuade. As well, it takes but a little thought to recognize that the speeches given on occasions of celebration and remembrance are a sort of persuasive speech. Men may need to be reminded of the guiding principles of their political community or of the sacrifices made by those who fell in war to preserve it.

If one studies history, or at least political history, an almost willful blindness would be required not to note the apparent consequences of the speeches of politicians. Considering the careers of men such as Abraham Lincoln or Sir Winston Churchill, one must suspect that the outcome of political events, some of which involve far-reaching or even monumental consequences, are decisively influenced by spoken words. Anyone who reads the powerful speeches of Lincoln must at least consider the possibility that they played a crucial role, not only in the victory of the North in the American Civil War, but also in fundamentally altering the character of the American regime or, as Lincoln himself persuasively argued, in fulfilling the true character of that regime.⁴ Something similar can be said about Churchill

and World War Two. Reading his speeches one is forced to admit that they--both those given before a live audience and in radio broadcasts--may have roused the resolve of a people reluctant to go to war and decidedly unprepared for war.⁵

Certain literary works also point to the importance of persuasion in politics. Homer and Shakespeare, arguably the two greatest poets of the Western literary tradition, are accorded their stature at least partly, if not primarily, because they are thoughtful observers of human life. For these two poets, human life is, essentially, political life. They recognize that leadership is critical to politics and that men lead other men through persuasion, securing their willingness to follow. Reading of the exploits of Odysseus or King Henry the Fifth, for instance, one cannot help but imagine them as consummate politicians who wield power, at least in certain respects, through their ability to persuade.⁶ If one allows oneself to be charmed by Homer's and Shakespeare's perceptive poetry, one is forced again to think seriously about the role persuasion plays in political life.

Our immediate experience of politics, the study of political history, and poetic imitations of politics all bespeak the need for agreement in the co-operative and communal life that is politics, and one may add, agreement that is secured through persuasion. This observation is suggestive in two respects. First, it suggests that the art of rhetoric may be invaluable to men who actively

participate in politics. Yet, today's budding politicians proceed to careers that certainly demand persuasive speech-making, never considering that the study of rhetoric might assist them. They attempt to persuade without the benefit of a rhetorical education. Second, this observation suggests that persuasion should be of interest to today's political scientists, as it is such an important aspect of political life. One might even expect that they would defend the importance of the study of the art of rhetoric as part of a general concern with the role of persuasion in political life.⁷ But they do not. What attention they do devote to persuasion is confined to the study of propaganda, which may rightly be accorded the epithet of "vulgar rhetoric."⁸

To be sure, the politicians' disregard of rhetoric and the political scientists' disregard of persuasion are related. Political scientists, and social scientists in general, present a view of political life that follows from a commitment to a method of inquiry shaped by modern natural science. This commitment, it seems, leads to a certain neglect: the neglect of persuasion. The men who aspire to careers in politics, who are almost all university graduates, learn from men who, through either an error of omission or commission, do not regard persuasion as an important aspect of politics.

Now, it would be simply wrong to suggest that modern political science has failed because of its inattention to

rhetoric. Modern political science has much to teach about contemporary politics, and has much, indeed, to give the man with a practical interest in politics. Polling methods, which are surely an offspring of this political science, are a definite requisite to success in democratic politics. It is also pertinent, here, to think of those political scientists who are experts on the politics of certain geographic areas or individual countries, and of those who are actually involved in politics, advising bureaucrats and politicians: in short, men who "know whereof they speak, ..." They would be able to teach the journeyman politician something worth knowing. Nevertheless, if we return to the foregoing observations about agreement and persuasion we see, on one hand, the possible importance of rhetoric for politics; and on the other, a political science which, in spite of its successes, neglects rhetoric. For clarity's sake we are prompted to ask whether persuasion and rhetoric are truly a necessary part of politics and whether political scientists should maintain an interest in rhetoric.

Even to begin to answer questions of such magnitude would seem, at first blush at least, impossibly difficult. But this need not be true. The study of works from the tradition of political philosophy can aid one in answering, or at least in beginning to answer, such questions. The philosophers who wrote the texts that compose that tradition recognize the importance of persuasion for politics, and

some devote entire books to the subject of rhetoric. This thesis examines what has come to be regarded as one of the most important and influential works on rhetoric: the Rhetoric of Aristotle. For anyone who is wont to ask questions about modern political science and the role persuasion and rhetoric play, or should play, in politics this book especially commends itself.

Here, clarification is in order. Anyone reading the Rhetoric finds that it is practical--that it is intended to provide men with a system of rhetoric. But one can learn more from Aristotle's treatise than the "how to" of persuasion. A treatise's practical character need not preclude its serving a higher purpose, and clearly Aristotle had a higher purpose in mind when he turned to the subject of rhetoric. Carnes Lord, discussing Aristotle's intention in writing the Rhetoric, neatly captures in a phrase this text's dual character: he suggests that thoughtful examination bids the reader regard it as being of "hybrid character" and "at once a theoretical treatise and a practical handbook, . . ."¹⁰ The higher purpose of the Rhetoric is theoretical, using the word "theoretical" in the sense Aristotle himself uses it in certain other of his works, i.e., to describe a form of knowledge that is valued for its own sake rather than for its practical consequences.¹¹ Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric not only to teach men the art of persuasive speaking but also to reveal the truth about one important aspect of politics--about

persuasion. This thesis looks to that higher theoretical purpose, drawing what insights it can from Aristotle's systematic account of rhetorical practice, with an eye to understanding the importance of the art of rhetoric for politics.

Even if one recognizes the theoretical character of the Rhetoric, to speak of practice may imply the simple task of learning lessons. It is possible to learn both practical and theoretical "lessons" from the Rhetoric, but to do so demands a certain effort. The Rhetoric is not a clear, concise textbook that can be read and understood with minimal effort; rather, it is a book which must be read with a sort of care not usually lavished on most books. One must read it many times, try to understand its structure, see parts of it as clarification and elaboration of other parts, and ponder its examples, puns, and word-play. In short, one must think about what the book explicitly says and, eventually, think about what it only intimates.

This reflective attitude becomes especially crucial when the reader confronts what some scholars deem to be discrepancies or anomalies in the text, which they take to be evidence that the Rhetoric is not a textual whole.¹² A serious, careful reading of the Rhetoric must, at least initially, place questions concerning the integrity of the text in abeyance. One is obliged, first, to step back from the textual oddities that scholars merely note and, instead, think about them. It is of the greatest importance that the

reader think about these oddities--and, indeed, the entire text--in light of his own experience and appreciation of persuasion and politics. Only by reading the text in a painstaking fashion does one enter into this domain of Aristotle's thought and discern something of his teaching about rhetoric.

Here, clarification is required once more. This thesis, though guided by the assumption that the Rhetoric must be considered as a textual whole, is not an examination of the entire text. To begin to lay hold of the teaching of the Rhetoric, it is not necessary, nor even wise perhaps, to attempt to deal explicitly with the text in its entirety. In fact, certain features of the text point to a sensible starting point for the task of dealing with the text as a whole. The surface of the Rhetoric, as we noted, seems--to use a kinder phrase--tarnished by equivocation, but this equivocation is not what it appears to be: it is actually an invitation for one to think. Aristotle's reader is invited to focus his thoughtful attention on the analyses of the various emotions that take up a major portion of the second of the three books in the text. Aristotle implicitly suggests that understanding the emotions is central to learning rhetoric and to learning about persuasion.¹³ And, he invites the reader to think primarily about one emotion--anger. It is indicated to be, in some sense, an exemplary instance of the emotions presented in the text that will help the reader to grasp the nature of emotion in

general. Stated boldly, then, this thesis proceeds assuming that an understanding of anger is essential to rhetorical practice and to theoretical insight into rhetoric's role in politics. Thus, the major portion of what follows is given over to a close commentary on Aristotle's analysis of anger.

It would be ineffective, however, to turn immediately to that commentary. The method of reading and studying Aristotle's Rhetoric employed here is, admittedly, controversial. There is the possibility that the present choice of subject might seem, to some at least, willful and arbitrary, not to say misguided. Consequently, certain preliminaries must be dealt with before moving to Aristotle's analysis of anger. Textual evidence that justifies this interest in emotion and, in particular, this interest in anger must be provided.

The Centrality of Emotion in the Rhetoric

In order to demonstrate that Aristotle wishes his reader to consider his analyses of the emotions as central to his system of rhetoric, it is necessary to look at statements from what might best be described as the "introduction" to the Rhetoric (1354a1-1358a35).¹⁴ Aristotle begins with a terse account of the project he undertakes.

Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic; for both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confined to any special science. Hence all men in a manner have a share of both; for all, up to a certain point, endeavour to criticize or uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to accuse. Now, the majority of people do this either at random or with a

familiarity arising from habit. But since both these ways are possible, it is clear that matters can be reduced to a system, for it is possible to observe (theōrein) the cause (aitia) of why some attain their end by familiarity and others by chance; and such an examination all would at once admit to be the function of an art (1354a1-11).

Aristotle states that rhetoric is related to dialectic, and seems to imply that both aim at persuasion of a sort. He then enumerates three ways in which men enjoy success in persuading. First, he claims that one might simply persuade by chance. Presumably this means that one may say something that happens to persuade without being aware of what actually contributes to persuasion. Second, Aristotle asserts that one can persuade because one has achieved "a familiarity arising from habit." This empirical familiarity would likely arise from attention to chance instances of persuasion. Through this attention one could, conceivably, become aware that on certain occasions success in persuasion follows from the use of the same tactic. As a result, one would be able to say something calculated to persuade when confronted by similar circumstances. Yet, this is not the knowledge of persuasion that Aristotle considers an art. This art--the third way one succeeds in persuading--follows from observation of the successes by those who persuade by chance and by familiarity. Through observation the cause for success may be discerned. That knowledge would constitute a true art of rhetoric.

After laying out the nature of the enterprise undertaken in the Rhetoric, Aristotle turns to consider, in

a general way, other accounts of rhetoric.

Now, those who compiled arts of speech have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs are the only things in it that come within the province of art; everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes which are the body of proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject; for the arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions of the soul (pathe tes psyche) has no connexion with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the dicast. The result would be that, if all trials were now carried on as they are in some cities, especially those that are well administered, there would be nothing left for the rhetorician to say. For all men either think that all the laws ought so to prescribe, or in fact carry out the principle and forbid speaking outside the subject, as in the court of Areopagus, and in this they are right. For it is wrong to warp the dicast's feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy, or pity, which would be like making the rule crooked which one intended to use. Further, it is evident that the only business of the litigant is to prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not; whether it is important or unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which the legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for the dicast himself to decide; it is not the business of the litigants to instruct him (1354a11-31).

Aristotle voices a criticism of others "who have compiled arts of speech," and who shall, here, be called "technologists," following Aristotle's characterization of their actions (cf. 1354b17, 1354b26, 1355a19, 1356a11, 1356a17). His criticism may be summarized as follows. They have not provided a full account of the art of rhetoric because they have neglected what Aristotle refers to as proofs, which are the whole of the art; nor have they dealt with enthymemes, which are the "body of proofs." The technologists, according to Aristotle, neglect those aspects of rhetoric and instead concentrate on arousing the various

"emotions of the soul."¹⁵ From this observation he draws a conclusion: if all trials were conducted the same way as they are conducted in cities that are well-ordered, there would be nothing left for the technologists to say. As an example, Aristotle cites the Athenian Areopagus, where speaking outside the matter under consideration is forbidden. He concludes the passage by stating that it is the business of a litigant to deal with the facts of a case, which are all those things "in which the legislator has not laid down a ruling." In short, his point is that those passing judgement in a case should be guided by the facts presented and by the law, rather than their emotions.

Aristotle, in this passage, appears to decry any appeal to the emotions by a speaker. He may be interpreted as endorsing a rational sort of persuasion (that of the enthymeme), which he will later state is the rhetorical "cousin" of the logical syllogism (1356a35-1356b18). It is this passage especially that provides the grounds for scholars to conclude that the Rhetoric is merely a "patch-work" of Aristotle's writings on rhetoric. They believe that the criticism of the technologists' interest in arousing emotions implies that that means of persuasion is not part of the art of rhetoric--that it is not a true proof. They also recognize, however, that the arousal of emotion is treated as an important means of persuasion in other portions of the text. These scholars believe that Aristotle both condemns and endorses the arousal of emotion

as a means of persuasion, and they draw their conclusions accordingly.

But is it correct to emphasize Aristotle's criticism of the technologists' concentration on the arousal of emotions, or is it more to the point to emphasize his criticism of the technologists' inability to speak in well-ordered regimes? It would perhaps be more to the point to emphasize the criticism of the technologists for their inability, as Aristotle surely seeks to teach a rhetoric that does not suffer from the same limitations as that of the technologists. A plausible inference that may be drawn from the attack on the technologists and Aristotle's own concentration on the emotions is that he presents an account of emotional persuasion that satisfies his dictum that proofs be enthymematic.¹⁶

Evidence supporting this inference is found in a subsequent statement made at some distance from the criticism of the technologists (1356a1-20). There, Aristotle acquaints his reader with the means by which a speaker can persuade his hearers. He enumerates three. A speaker can persuade by appearing to be of certain character (ēthos): this renders him worthy of trust. Aristotle claims this as the strongest means of persuasion--and one which the technologists have ignored. The second means of persuasion enumerated is the arousal of emotion (pathos).¹⁷ This Aristotle remarks, is the sole interest of the technologists. He also notes that men's judgements are not

the same when influenced by "pain and joy or love and hate." The content of a speaker's speech also can persuade. Men, he says, are persuaded by what is "true or appears true" (alēthes ē phainomenon). Having enumerated these three means of persuasion, Aristotle briefly discusses the abilities required by those who seek to persuade. Here, one should note, he speaks of "proofs effected by these means" and claims "a man must be capable of reckoning (syllogisasthai), of observing characters and virtues, and third, of observing the emotions--the nature of each, its origin, and the manner in which it is produced" (1356a23-25). Not only does this passage suggest that one who seeks to persuade must be well versed in the nature of the emotions, it also states quite clearly that the arousal of emotions is considered by Aristotle to be part of the "body of proofs" he speaks of at the outset of the introduction to his treatise (cf. 1354a15, 1403b9-14).

It is evident, then, that Aristotle includes persuasion through the arousal of emotion as part of his systematic account of rhetoric. This means of persuasion is not to be understood in opposition to a more logical means of persuasion, but that conclusion does not imply Aristotle's analyses of the emotions are in any way the central feature of the Rhetoric. From the portions of text addressed thus far it is correct to conclude only that persuasion through emotion can be accomplished through logical means, and that Aristotle's division is not as strict as it seems.

Aristotle, however, makes statements outside the bounds of his introduction that force a further reconsideration of this taxonomy of the means of persuasion, a reconsideration which shows that the analyses of the various emotions presented in the Rhetoric do not simply serve to teach about one artful means of persuasion, but that they must be seen as a qualification of that taxonomy of the means of persuasion.

The crucial instance of qualification occurs in a section of text at the beginning of Book Two which is a "preface" to the analyses of the emotions (1378a6-19). There, Aristotle hints that an understanding of the emotions contributes, in part, to an understanding of persuasion through character. He asserts, first, that for a speaker to persuade by seeming to be of a certain character, he must appear, through his speech, to have three qualities: prudence, virtue, and goodwill. The appearance of prudence and virtue indicate that a man is capable of formulating good advice and that he would render it. One learns how these qualities may be exemplified in a speech from the discussion of the materials for epideictic rhetoric found in Book One.¹⁸ While the appearance of prudence and virtue would seem sufficient to secure the trust of a hearer, Aristotle thinks not; the quality of goodwill is also required. Aristotle is not altogether explicit when he speaks of goodwill; he does, however, conclude his prefatory remarks about the emotions with an indication of what must

be done to acquire an understanding of this quality. He states, somewhat cryptically, that "goodwill and friendship" (eunoias kai philias) will be dealt with "in the discussion of the emotions" (1378a18-19). To understand goodwill, then, it is necessary to turn to the analyses of the emotions, looking especially to the emotion of friendship--an emotion of which Aristotle treats (1380b35-1381b37).

Aristotle's statements concerning the art of rhetoric and the emotions support a tentative conclusion regarding the position of the emotions in his systematic teaching about rhetoric. They seem to be at its center. This conclusion ultimately stems from a confrontation with a problem: the problem of giving an account of the nature of the means of persuasion Aristotle enumerates. He first speaks of rousing emotions in a derogatory sense, but later hints that there may be a reasoned appeal to the emotions. Then, he provides a taxonomy which strictly divides the means of persuasion; but as well, he makes statements that significantly qualify his division, and, indeed, suggest that understanding the true nature of these means of persuasion may derive from the study of the emotions. These progressive qualifications make the reader aware that giving an account of "being persuaded" is no simple task, but they show, too, that Aristotle's account is to be found in a consideration of the psychology presented in the Rhetoric. One must turn, then, to the analyses of the emotions, antecedently aware that Aristotle does not always present

his teaching in a straightforward manner.

Aristotle's analyses of the various emotions, and of friendship especially, would seem to demand the reader's immediate attention. But close scrutiny of the content of the Rhetoric forces another reconsideration--in this instance, with regard to the study of emotion. The Rhetoric, one finds, apparently lacks something crucial. A text that lays stress on the importance of understanding the emotions could be expected to contain a general account of emotion that complements and ties together its accounts of particular emotions. But the Rhetoric does not. This is, however, no oversight on Aristotle's part. He recognizes the need for a general account of emotion and satisfies it by treating one emotion--anger--as exemplary. Anger in the Rhetoric provides the example that teaches the reader about emotion. But because Aristotle does not state openly that anger has this special status, it is necessary to collect textual evidence to support this interpretation.

Aristotle first gives an indication that he wishes his reader to regard anger with special care in the discussion of the materials suitable for forensic speeches in Book One of the text (1368b32-1369a7). In this brief passage, Aristotle, proceeding taxonomically, enumerates the causes of human action--or more precisely, the causes of human action as they would be addressed in rhetorical speech. He begins by dividing these causes into two major groups: those for which men are not responsible and those for which they

are responsible. The causes for which men are not responsible can, according to Aristotle, be divided between chance and necessity, and those placed in the category of necessity can be further divided between compulsion and nature. The causes for which men are responsible can be divided between habit and longing. Longing, Aristotle states, can be further divided into rational and irrational longing, and irrational longings can be further divided into categories of anger (orgē) and desire (epithymia). This taxonomy is peculiar in many respects, but here, all its peculiarities need not be addressed. One must attend, however, to the word "anger." Its use should strike the reader as odd. Aristotle seems to assert that a single emotion--anger--causes men to act. But he immediately discredits this idea in a recapitulation of the causes of human action. He lists seven causes: "chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, spirit (thymos), and desire . . ." and thus substitutes the word "anger" for the word "spirit." Questions arise. Does Aristotle refer to something other than anger when he speaks of spirit? Or are the words "anger" and "spirit" simply synonyms?

Another passage from the discussion of the materials for forensic rhetoric provides the beginning of an answer to these related questions (1373b35-38). There, Aristotle declares "that all accusations concern the public or the private, whether the act was done out of ignorance or unintentionally, or intentionally with knowledge, and of the

latter whether from forethought or emotion" and then says "we will speak of spirit in speaking of the emotions, . . .". In this case Aristotle suggests to his reader that he regards spirit as the seat of the emotions. Comparing this passage with the first cited, it seems appropriate to at least entertain the notion that the substitution of spirit for anger is an indication that anger, in Aristotle's view, is somehow representative of the emotions.

This identification of anger with spirit, the reader discovers, is not a textual oddity confined to those two passages. When Aristotle moves to a detailed discussion of the causes of human action immediately following his taxonomic division, he does not treat of anger and spirit separately, but together, saying only this: "acts of revenge are taken on account of spirit and anger" (1369b11-12). There, he persists in his identification of spirit with anger. Two other instances of this identification are found where Aristotle quotes a passage from Homer's Iliad as evidence of the pleasure one feels when angry (1370b10-12, 1378b4-7). On both occasions the quotations are introduced by a statement that their evidence concerns the nature of spirit rather than anger, thereby identifying anger with spirit. A final piece of evidence is found in Aristotle's analysis of mildness, the emotional opposite of anger. There, Aristotle states, first, that men "cease to be angry" with those who admit their offence and are sorry (1380a16). As a sign of this, he offers the case of punishing slaves:

with them, men "cease to be spirited when they admit they are justly punished" (1380a18-19). Once more, he identifies anger with the emotional realm of spirit. Collecting these instances of what can only be regarded as an intentional identification of anger and spirit, one suspects that Aristotle wishes his reader to see anger as somehow representative of the emotional realm of spirit and, indeed, see anger as somehow exemplary--at least in the confines of the Rhetoric.

Anger's service as a special example is also suggested by structural features of the text. Bearing in mind this link between anger and spirit, it is possible to gain some insight into the order in which Aristotle chooses to present the emotions. One should notice that anger is the first emotion dealt with in Book Two. It is placed at the beginning of the section devoted to the emotions, and this is surely the correct position for an example that will provide a general view of emotion that is to help to illuminate the nature of the particular emotions. Moreover, the emotion that follows anger is friendship, the one other emotion we have seen Aristotle call to his reader's attention: placed, one may presume, so as to be contrasted with anger. And, finally, a comparison of Aristotle's analysis of anger with his analyses of the other emotions reveals his treatment of anger to be more extensive and detailed than his treatment of the other emotions. In fact, Aristotle pointedly truncates some of his analyses, inviting

his reader to complete the analysis in accordance with a general conception of emotion found in the pattern of anger. These structural features serve as a confirmation that anger is to serve as the example of emotion in the Rhetoric. Paying careful attention to such details in Aristotle's text, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that anger is somehow crucial to unlocking the text as a whole.

Where, then, does Aristotle lead his reader? To a beginning that can only be described as commonsensical. One's commonsense experience of the realm of politics indicates that emotion has something to do with persuasion. Men, to state the matter simply, are moved to judge or to act by their emotions. But Aristotle holds out the promise of more: the promise of a systematic account of the emotions and their role in persuasion. He first suggests that he presents a consistent teaching that includes the arousal of emotion as one means of persuasion. He then suggests that an understanding of the emotions--particularly friendship--is requisite to understanding the quality of goodwill, a quality a speaker must demonstrate through his speeches in order to persuade through character. He finally suggests that emotion may be comprehended through the study of a single emotion--anger. The reader's attention is directed to friendship, goodwill, and anger. Turning to the analysis of anger, the reader finds he is provided with the resources to think about the relationship of the three. It is thought about this triad of anger, goodwill, and friendship that

provides the beginning of an understanding of Aristotle's teaching in the Rhetoric.

Notes

1 John H. Mackin, Classical Rhetoric for Modern Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 16.

2 I owe my rudimentary understanding of this transformation, which seems the direct result of the modern philosophic project, to the writings of Leo Strauss. One might mention many of his works in this regard. In attempting to understand this change I found his essay "An Epilogue" particularly helpful. See Leo Strauss, "An Epilogue," Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, ed. Herbert J. Storing (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1962). I also benefitted from the writings of George Grant on modernity and its consequences for politics and education. See, especially, his Technology and Empire: Perspectives on North America (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969). Thinking about rhetoric specifically, I was aided by the writings of Richard M. Weaver: he has thought very carefully about the demise of rhetorical education. See Language is Sermonic: Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric, eds. Richard L. Johannsen, Rennard Strickland, and Ralph T. Eubanks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970).

3 Weaver, Language is Sermonic, p. 201. The emphasis is Weaver's.

4 For a clear demonstration of the importance of Lincoln's speeches see Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Issues in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959; reprint ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

5 Further testimony of the power of Churchill's speeches is the adoption by English speakers of certain phrases drawn from them, e.g., "their finest hour," "blood, sweat, tears," or "the end of the beginning."

6 Consider, for instance, Iliad 2. 284-332, 9. 225-306, and The Life of King Henry the Fifth, III, iii, 1-43; IV, iii, 18-67.

7 It is interesting to note that in the twentieth century philosophy has become preoccupied with questions concerning language. But despite, or perhaps because of, this preoccupation the proponents of this sort of philosophizing seem, for the most part, to ignore rhetoric, although they do not necessarily ignore politics.

8 Strauss, "An Epilogue," p. 312; compare Weaver, Language is Sermonic, p. 161.

9 Werner J. Dannhauser, "On Teaching Politics Today," Commentary 59 (March 1975): 75.

10 Carnes Lord, "The Intention of Aristotle's Rhetoric," Hermes (1981): 327. Two other commentators are in substantial agreement with Lord about the character of the Rhetoric. See Eugene F. Miller, "The Primary Questions of Political Inquiry," Review of Politics 39 (1977): 298-331; and see Larry Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the "Rhetoric" (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981). Arnhart makes many of the important points from his book in an article entitled "The Rationality of Political Speech: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Rhetoric," Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (September 1981): 141-154. These three commentators, to whom I owe a debt, have written works that are valuable aids for anyone who wishes to make a serious study of the Rhetoric.

11 Consider Topics 157a10-11, Nicomachean Ethics 1139b14-1141a8, and Metaphysics 1025b1-1026a33. Nietzsche, in his lecture notes on rhetoric, declares that the Rhetoric is "purely philosophical and most influential for all later conceptual determinations of the concept [i.e., the concept of rhetoric], . . ." Carole Blair, trans., "Nietzsche's Lecture Notes on Rhetoric: a Translation," Philosophy and Rhetoric 16 (1983): 100.

12 A brief summary of this scholarly approach to the Rhetoric is found in George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 82-87. A more detailed summary as well as an extensive refutation of the approach is that of William M. A. Grimaldi, Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's "Rhetoric" (Weisbaden: F. Steiner, 1972), pp. 18-52.

13 Martin Heidegger regards Aristotle's analyses of the emotions as the practical and theoretical core of the Rhetoric. In Being and Time, he states the following:
 "Aristotle investigates the pathē (affects) in the second book of his Rhetoric. Contrary to the traditional orientation, according to which rhetoric is conceived as the kind of thing we 'learn in school', this work of Aristotle must be taken as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another. Publicness, as the kind of Being which belongs to the 'they'. . . , not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and 'makes' them for itself. It is into such a mood and out of such a mood that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright."
 [Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,

Inc., 1962), p. 178.]

14 Bracketed citations refer to the standard pagination of Aristotle's Rhetoric. The quotations cited here are drawn from the Rhetoric, trans. John Henry Freese (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926). In certain instances I have made changes in order to provide a more literal or more readable translation of Aristotle's text. In the bracketed citations occasionally there will appear references to works by other authors. In these cases, as well, standard pagination is employed.

15 For the purpose of this inquiry, which is to capture Aristotle's teaching about persuasion and make it accessible to a contemporary reader, the best translation of the Greek word pathos is the English word "emotion." If one were to trace the influence of Aristotle's analyses of the pathē through the tradition of political philosophy it would perhaps be best to translate pathos as "passion." This, of course, is the word employed by Hobbes in Leviathan when he discusses human psychology. Consider Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 118-130.

16 Arthur B. Miller and John D. Bee, in an article devoted to the emotional dimension of Aristotle's Rhetoric make some noteworthy etymological speculation about the word "enthymeme." They observe that it consists of en and thymos. That the root of the word is thymos, which, as we shall see, is often associated with emotion, "reveals that enthymemes inherently involve an affective component that operates from a base of feelings and emotions." Enthymematic speech, according to this etymological exercise, is, then, speech directed at the emotions. See their "Enthymemes: Body and Soul," Philosophy and Rhetoric 5 (1972): 202.

17 It is worth noting that Aristotle, in his enumeration of the means of persuasion, places the arousal of emotion in the centre of three. In addition, one should note that the discussion of persuasion through emotion is centered between the discussion of the materials for speeches and the discussion of persuasion through character. Perhaps this is a hint suggesting that the analyses of the emotions are of central importance.

18 Aristotle discusses three types of rhetoric: deliberative, epideictic, and forensic. Their respective concerns are the expedient and the harmful, the noble and the disgraceful, and the just and unjust (1358b20-29).

II. ANGER, GOODWILL, AND FRIENDSHIP

Anger as a Disposition (1378a30-1379a29)

Aristotle states in the preface to the analyses of the emotions that each analysis has three parts: a discussion of the emotion as a psychic disposition, a discussion of the objects of the emotion, and a discussion of the occasions on which the emotion arises (1378a18-19).¹ In the case of anger Aristotle treats the first two explicitly; the last, he treats implicitly throughout the analysis.

To begin his consideration of anger as a disposition, Aristotle defines anger.

Let anger be a longing accompanied by pain for an apparent revenge (timōrias phainomenēs) on account of an apparent slight (phainomenen oligōrian) to a man himself or one of his own when the slight is not fitting.²

It was noted in the introduction to this commentary that Aristotle, in laying out his rhetorical taxonomy of human behaviour, places anger, or spirit, and desire in the category of longings. Here, more is said. Pain accompanies anger, and the cause of that pain is an apparent slight. This definition also points to the fact that the pain of anger is not only felt when a slight is directed at oneself but also when it is directed at those to whom one is emotionally connected--one's own, the best example being one's family. But perhaps the most important element of the definition is the qualification of the words "revenge" and "slight" by the word "apparent." For a man to be roused to

anger it must appear to him that he has been slighted. This qualification means, simply, that a man must have a reason to be angry--a reason that he may supply himself (he senses that he has been slighted) or that may be supplied by someone else (he is shown by another that he has been slighted).³ That anger has this rational component is well illustrated by a phrase from everyday speech. Men say that they have "good reason" to be angry. This sort of "logic" also applies to revenge. A man must have reason to believe that adequate revenge has been exacted before he is satisfied.

Aristotle defines anger substantively and then deduces certain implications from his definition. He states that anger is necessarily directed at a "certain individual, such as with Cleon, but not with man in general." This individual either does something or is about to do something to "a man or one of his own."⁴ Thus, he implies that a man has another in mind when he is angry, and that even an intention to slight is sufficient to rouse anger. Next, Aristotle gives examples that show anger to be accompanied by pleasure, as well as pain. Anger, he claims, is pleasurable because of the hope of exacting revenge. He states that "it is pleasant to believe one will obtain what one aims at." To this statement Aristotle adds a proviso: "no one aims at what appears impossible; the angry man aims at what is possible." As an example of this pleasure Aristotle cites a speech from Homer's Iliad by Achilles--a man who hopes to exact revenge

and surely believes himself capable of doing so. In his speech Achilles says this of anger: "far sweeter than honey that drips / it flourishes in the hearts of men . . ."⁵

At this point it is appropriate to note that Achilles plays a prominent role in the Rhetoric. Aristotle, through the use of Achilles' name in the text, calls attention to this hero, and leads his reader to think about Achilles and persuasion, and most definitely about Achilles and anger.⁶ His importance to a fuller understanding of anger will be addressed in a special digression later in this commentary.

Having indicated one way in which anger is pleasurable Aristotle distinguishes another that is related to the first. Men derive pleasure from the hope of eventually exacting revenge, but also from the hope found in imagining the exacting of revenge. He states that "men dwell on the thought of revenge, and the vision (phantasia) that arises at that moment produces pleasure like that from the things seen in sleep." In words that preserve an illuminating etymological connection, men derive pleasure from their fantasies about revenge. They find a dreamy sort of pleasure in imagining--or fantasizing about--an act of revenge. A man who wishes to move men to act through speech must tap this power of imagination both in rousing and in guiding anger, i.e., to prompt his hearers to imagine in their mind's eye a slight that will rouse anger and, as well, imagine in the future the possibility of exacting some revenge. Men will lend their support to an act of revenge if they feel it is

justified and can imagine what effect it will have.

While the experience of anger is common to all men, few would be able to describe it, much less begin to analyze it. With but a few sentences Aristotle captures its essential features: the pain, the pleasure, the hope of revenge. He draws his reader into a consideration of the emotion with this description and then moves to a deeper level of analysis. He enlarges his definition of anger by defining slight--that which provokes or causes anger. Slight, he says,

is an actualization of opinion regarding something which appears worthless: for good things and bad things we believe to be worthy of consideration; those which are of no importance or small we ignore.

This sentence is somewhat obscure. Its meaning, along with a clearer picture of slight, comes from the subsequent enumeration and discussion of what Aristotle regards as the three forms of slight: contempt (kataphronēsis), spite (epēreasmos), and insult (hybris).

Aristotle treats contempt and spite together in a surprisingly brief fashion. "One who contemns, slights," he says, "since men condemn those things they believe to be worthless." Contempt involves a disregard for what men take to be worthwhile. Contempt would seem, then, somewhat innocuous, and judging by the amount of text Aristotle devotes to it, to be of minimal importance; it has, however, important rhetorical ramifications well beyond what this one sentence might be thought to indicate.⁷ Thinking of men's opinions about what is worthwhile, there is a tendency to

think simply of disagreements about tastes and preferences. These disagreements might lead to anger but they would hardly seem to be of political import. If a man more or less openly contemns what many men think important then it is a far more serious matter. To contemn what the members of a political community, or for that matter any group, think worthy of seriousness, is to invite anger. If a man shows contempt for another's religious beliefs it can be a rather significant, anger-provoking matter. And if a man, in a democracy, were, say, to show his contempt for democratic freedom or for egalitarianism, he would likely meet with anger. One may think of those men in today's democracies who are perceived to harbour "authoritarian" or "elitist" sentiments. Here, one sees how a speaker might reason with an audience's capacity for anger. A speaker could show that they have reason to be angry with someone because of his contempt for what they hold dear.

There is an aspect of the discussion of contempt, however, that is somewhat less straightforward. Aristotle will later state that irony is a form of contempt (1379b30-31). This would be nothing remarkable except for the fact that Aristotle is the third generation of a philosophic tradition that begins with his teacher's teacher, Socrates, whose habitual mode of speech was irony. Socrates, like Achilles, is a prominent figure in the Rhetoric.⁸ Aristotle's attention to Achilles guides his reader to the Iliad, while his attention to Socrates guides

his reader to the dialogues of Plato, and one dialogue in particular: the Apology of Socrates.' It is in that dialogue, cast in the form of a "defence" speech by Socrates at his famous trial, that one gets a taste, as the jurors did, of Socrates' irony and contempt--and other forms of slight, as well. As attention to Achilles and the Iliad proves to assist one in understanding Aristotle's analysis of anger, so does attention to Socrates and the Apology. A digression on Socrates is also made later in this commentary.

Spite, according to Aristotle, is a form of slight because it is contempt. It is a contempt that involves "placing obstacles in the way of another's wishes, . . ." not for any advantage for the one who spites but to prevent some advantage coming to the one at whom the spite is directed. Aristotle adds that the man who spites another does not act out of self-interest. If he were afraid of another man he would not spite him, and if he saw the other as useful "he would take care to be a friend (philos)."¹⁰

Spite is contempt, and slight, because in obstructing someone's wishes a man indicates that what the other wishes is not worth consideration. Thus, it is contempt springing from the active opposition of another's wishes, and not for the sake of any advantage. It is simply gratuitous pleasure-taking. Men have certain wishes. When they are opposed in attaining those wishes, they are roused. They grow angry and are moved to attempt to remove or to punish

whoever obstructs them. Even when they are not being opposed for the sake of pleasure men will often think themselves victims of spite and grow angry as a result. Men impute motives to others with a certain hastiness--and this haste is surely an essential characteristic of anger.' ' They, to cite a common example, grow angry at those who will not acquiesce to their requests, and often will claim that they are victims of spite because those who oppose them are simply taking pleasure in the exercise of power. Be that as it may, Aristotle, once more, provides grounds for a speaker to reason with men's anger. A speaker could, conceivably, rouse the anger of an audience by showing that someone has behaved in a manner that indicates spite.

Insult is the third form of slight and that which Aristotle treats at the greatest length. Again, he defines.

Insult consists in harming or paining by means of which there is shame for the sufferer, not so that anything comes to the one that insults, but so that the one who insults derives pleasure, for those who retaliate do not insult but take revenge. The cause of the pleasure for those who insult is that they believe by doing ill they are more fully showing their superiority. Wherefore, the young and the wealthy are insulters, for as they insult they believe they are superior.

One who insults does not cause pain through disregard or obstruction, as is the case with contempt or spite, but through an active attempt to cause shame in a man, thus providing the insulter with pleasure. Aristotle's definition contains an important caveat that discloses how one might reason with people's anger in order to persuade them. This caveat is a distinction between two actions that cause pain.

Paining another merely for the sake of pleasure is insult; whereas paining another for pleasure because one has already been pained is revenge. The former strikes men as disgusting and as unjust, and the latter as wholesome and just. So, insult, which might be mistaken for revenge, is distinguished, like spite, by untoward, unjust pleasure-taking. This pleasure is caused by a sense of superiority that comes from ill-treating others. Men attempt to elevate themselves by shaming others, i.e., by lowering others. Aristotle's examples point to the human striving for superiority and the all-too-human attempt to compel recognition of superiority. The young and the wealthy have only tenuous claims to superiority: for example, the young may mistake their youthful idealism for nobility; the wealthy see their wealth as evidence of their ability to rule (1389a28-35, 1391a12-13). Again Aristotle gives grounds for a speaker to rouse anger.¹²

Aristotle speaks about these exemplary insulters and then moves to a discussion of dishonor, which is the essence of insult. "One who dishonors, slights," he contends, "for that which is worthless has no honor, either as good or evil." For examples, Aristotle looks again to the Iliad and cites speeches by Achilles. In the first citation, drawn from the beginning of the Iliad, Achilles exclaims: "he has dishonored me for by taking he, himself, has my prize."¹³ In the second, Achilles says he has been treated "like some dishonored vagrant."¹⁴ Then, Aristotle moves to clarify the

nature of dishonor. He states that

men believe that it is fitting they be esteemed by those inferior in birth, ability, virtue, and generally in whatever respect a man is superior to another: such as, the rich man by the poor with respect to money; the rhetorician by the man who is not powerful in speaking with respect to speech; the ruler by the ruled; and the man who believes himself worthy of ruling by those worthy of being ruled.¹⁵

Men believe their superiority should be recognized and take themselves to be dishonored when it goes unrecognized. To dishonor someone--which is a slight--is to call into question their superiority by implying they are indistinguishable from their inferiors and not worthy of esteem.

Aristotle's discussion of dishonor with its examples bespeaks a shift of emphasis. The discussion of contempt and spite prompts Aristotle's reader to think of a speaker rousing the anger of an audience. This discussion of dishonor concentrates on the anger of individuals--talented individuals, or at least men who think themselves worthy of honor. The emphasis of this passage serves to remind us that politicians may be animated by a concern for honor, and that when the desire for honor is left unsatisfied they grow angry. Anger, one suspects, can lead to political disarray. Again, Aristotle quotes from the Iliad, this time focusing on Agamemnon's kingship. In the first quotation Odysseus warns the Achaians not to heed Agamemnon's proposal that they depart the siege of Troy, saying "[g]reat is the spirit of kings nourished by Zeus, . . ."¹⁶ In the second Kalchas, a seer, worries about Agamemnon's resentment. His worry is

that ". . . , even afterwards he holds a grudge, . . . "''

The various men Aristotle enumerates "feel irritation on account of their superiority." Previously, one may have simply thought of guiding the anger of citizens. Here, one is forced to think of a speaker guiding active political leaders.

Finally, Aristotle notes that men feel an irritation if they are not "treated well" by those from whom they believe it "to be proper." The grounds for this feeling are that one should be well-treated if one has done or is doing something for another, or if one wishes or has wished to do something for another. A sort of pain accrues to one who treats others well and gets nothing in return. Such a man thinks he has been ill used. Aristotle reminds his reader of the potential for anger to flair up in political life, as it so often involves, or seems for some to involve, treating others well with no return.

Aristotle then begins to summarize anger as a disposition. This summary is rather peculiar, however, as it introduces another psychological, not to mention a physiological, dimension that was not present in the discussion itself. Aristotle begins this summary with the following words.

Men are angry when they are pained, for the man who is pained aims at something. If, then, anyone directly opposes a man in anything, as, for instance, prevents him drinking when thirsty, or if not, appears to do the same thing. And if ever someone opposes him, or does not assist him, or troubles him in any other way when he is in this frame of mind, he is angry with all such persons.

It is possible to see how anger, given what has been said before, may be described as a pain that is the result of having one's aims thwarted. Men would like others to share their beliefs about what is most important. When others do not they feel slighted. Men move to fulfill certain wishes. When others oppose them and they cannot, they feel slighted. Men want to be honored by others. When they are not, they feel slighted. All, in a sense, are aims, and one can see how, when those aims are thwarted, pain and anger are the consequence.

Aristotle draws a conclusion from his initial summary which, however, suggests something more.

Wherefore, the sick, the poor, those at war, lovers (erōntes), the thirsty, and generally, those who desire (epithymountes) and are unsuccessful are prone to anger and are easy to urge on, especially with respect to those who slight their present condition: such as the sick man with respect to sickness, the poor man with respect to matters concerning his poverty, the man at war with respect to war, the lover with respect to love, and similarly with respect to other things. For each man's anger, the way is prepared with respect to each matter by the existing emotion (pathos).¹⁸

In this passage there are only mere echos of the discussion of the three types of slight. Here, a certain concentration on the body is evident. Aristotle speaks of thirst, sickness, erotic love: all are conditions that somehow pertain to the body. He speaks of poverty: a situation where one has difficulty "keeping body and soul together." And he speaks of war: a political act in which one risks one's body to help preserve a political community--which is a collection of individual bodies. One is inclined to ask

questions. Of what significance is the body for understanding anger? Of what significance is the body for rhetoric?

With this mention of the body Aristotle takes his reader to a deeper appreciation of anger. The body and its desires are mentioned in the text (1383a3-8, 1385a21-28, 1386a7-9, 1389a3-11, 1390a11-15; cf. 1355a36-1355b2). Men, or at least most men, one is reminded, are very concerned about the satisfaction of bodily desire and do grow angry, as the two previous passages show, when they are obstructed. This particular manifestation of anger, with its physiological emphasis, would seem somewhat out of place in the Rhetoric. Nonetheless, it is of some importance for understanding politics and anger.

When men go unsatisfied anger is the result, and that anger may well be directed at political leaders. For instance, when there are economic problems in a community politicians are blamed and become the objects of people's anger. Men are often preoccupied with their own satisfaction; but at the same time, men look to their political community to help them satisfy their desires. Realizing this one is, thus, forced to look upon one of the perennial problems of political life. A politician must harness men together for the sake of concerted action. He must, it seems, overcome men's concern for themselves and for their own--a concern betrayed by their anger--and persuade them to act for a larger common good, realizing

that he himself may have to bear people's anger (cf. 1378a31, 1371b18-25).¹⁹

Aristotle completes his summary of anger as a disposition with some lines that support this interpretation.

Again, men are angry when the event is contrary to their expectation, for the more unexpected a thing is, the more it pains; just as they are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation, what they wish comes to pass.

This passage makes one think of the grim reality of politics, with its unexpected changes of fortune. Men wish and hope, looking into the future. They lend their support to politicians and policies, from economic programs through to war, and have, as a result, certain expectations. If fortune does not smile, there is pain and there is anger at those who lead--for they seem, and may actually be, responsible. This passage evokes with a certain finality the predicament political leaders face when they attempt to lead other men.²⁰

Aristotle concludes his discussion of anger as a psychic disposition with this brief statement. He states that from what has gone before

it is obvious what are the seasons, times, dispositions, and times of life which are easily moved to anger; and what are the various times, places, and reasons, which make us more prone to anger in proportion as we are subject to their influence.

He, thus, leaves the reader with the suggestion that his discussion will bear greater scrutiny and will provide insight into human character.

The Objects of Anger (1379a30-1380a5)

Aristotle's discussion of the objects of anger, those with whom men grow angry, derives in large measure from the discussion of anger as a disposition. Though it is derivative, it adds much to the reader's understanding of anger and persuasion. As was noted previously, when Aristotle claims that goodwill may be understood through the study of the emotions he makes a curious addition. He states that "goodwill and friendship" are to be understood through that study. It was assumed, then, that friendship--one of the emotions he analyzes--would play some role in discerning what Aristotle means when he speaks of goodwill. In the analysis, thus far, we have seen only one mention of friendship. A concern for friendship, however, permeates the discussion of the objects of anger.²¹ From that discussion one begins to comprehend the relation of anger to friendship and to acquire some inkling of what goodwill might be.

Aristotle's discussion of the objects of anger is, essentially, a list--a list of those with whom men grow angry. Aristotle begins with these objects.

Men are angry with those who ridicule, mock, and joke, for this is insult. And with those who injure them in ways that are indications of insult. But these acts must be of such a kind that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous to those who commit them, for when they are not they appear to be on account of insult.

Anyone sifting through his personal experience realizes that this is not always the case. Men do not always grow angry with those who do such things. Aristotle confirms this in

his analysis of friendship. There, he claims that a friend is one who can both make and take a joke (1381a32-35). On the other hand, anyone, after some reflection about friendship, would likely say that there are instances when a friend will go too far in his joking and this will result in the anger of the one who bears the brunt of the joke. It is possible to state the matter in a formula: men who are friends have expectations about what is right or proper. When those expectations are not met, anger is the result. This link between anger and friendship is stressed throughout the discussion of the objects of anger.

Aristotle then turns to another object of anger, delineating it in a few sentences. These sentences might seem somewhat odd to a casual reader, but to a reader who is acquainted with ancient political philosophy they must be regarded as somewhat strange. They culminate in a pun that some interpret as an attack on Aristotle's teacher, Plato.

Men are angry with those who speak ill and contemn those things about which men are especially serious: such as those contend (philotimoumenoi) with regard to philosophy (philosophia) if ever someone does this with respect to philosophy, or such as those who contend with regard to form (idea) if ever someone does this with respect to form, and in other cases of the same sort.

Aristotle states, then, that one might grow angry with someone who contemns philosophy or form. The Greek word for form is idea, indicating a person's looks or appearance, but also indicating the epistemological doctrine found in the Platonic dialogues.²² Those who interpret this simply as an attack on Plato seem to overlook a more important feature of

the passage. Men are objects of anger in these cases because they condemn those things that another deems to be important. Those who are serious about philosophy, i.e., those who love wisdom, have the same love, as Plato and Aristotle did. They expect other men to love what they do, and grow angry when someone condemns what they happen to love. To have the same love may lead, as the passage indicates, to a certain contentiousness amongst fellow lovers. A philosopher may wish that he and his doctrines are accorded the highest honor. This passage reminds the reader of a simple truth about human nature: men love certain things and look with favor upon those who love as they do and with disfavor upon those who do not.

Here, however, reader would lose sight of the general theme of the Rhetoric if he did not recognize the friendly, loving character of political communities. Aristotle, in the Rhetoric and other works, sees the political community as a species of friendship (1362b29-1363a1, 1363a33-34).²³ Political communities are animated by some notion of good and bad--a love of a sort. The members of a political community look upon those outside their community--those who do not share that notion--with a certain suspicion, if not actual hatred. For instance, in democracies men could be said to love freedom. They would look with suspicion on a politician who did not seem to share that love; conversely, they would probably be more inclined to trust a politician who did and, indeed, would be more inclined to be persuaded

by him. This notion of friendship gives one an insight into goodwill. Given what has been said about anger and friendship, goodwill may be characterized as demonstrating that one loves the same things and grows angry over the same slights.²⁴

From this peculiar introduction to friendship Aristotle moves to a comment on those things that men do take seriously.

These matters are much greater if they suspect that they do not possess these things, either not at all, or not to any great extent, or they do not seem to possess them. For when they believe strongly that they do possess these things which are the subject of joking they pay no heed. And they are more angry with those who are friends (philoi) than with those who are not, for men think it more fitting to be well treated by them than not.

Men, then, are more likely to be roused to anger if they are doubtful about what they possess when someone mocks them. Men's self-esteem more often than not springs from their relations with others and especially from their relations with friends. Men who are tied together in a relation of friendship expect a certain "give and take" in these matters. A man who treats another well and makes a habit of it, i.e., one who behaves as a friend, expects, as a matter of justice, similar treatment in return. Thus, in the case of friends, men are more angry because they expect friendly behavior. As Aristotle states in his analysis of friendship: friends overlook faults (1381a28-32, 1381b2-9).

Aristotle continues in a similar vein, emphasizing man's concern for reciprocity and recognition of relative

superiority and inferiority.

Men are angry with those who have been in the habit of honoring them or paying them heed, if they no longer behave so towards them, for they believe they are being contemned by them and believe that they should do the same, as before. And with those who do not return in goodly fashion nor requite them equally. And with those who oppose them, if they are inferiors, for all such men appear to contemn, the latter as if they regarded them as inferiors, the former as if they had received kindness from inferiors. Men are more angry with those who are of no account, if they slight, for as a rule, anger at a slight was assumed to be felt with respect to those for whom slighting is not fitting--as it is fitting that inferiors do not slight.²⁵

The relation of men to others involves expectations. If a man has been honored by another he expects similar treatment. Men who do good deeds for others, as is the case with friends, expect those favors be returned. If the favors are not returned then a man feels himself treated as an inferior. Because friendship involves a certain reciprocity, not to return a favor indicates that a man is not worth treating in a reciprocal way (cf. 1380b36-1381a3, 1381a11-13). Men who feel themselves to be above others suffer anger when they are opposed by men they consider to be their inferiors. An inferior has no place opposing one who is superior.²⁶

The objects Aristotle next enumerates emphasize the sympathy that is expected in a friendly relationship. As Aristotle implies, friends share pleasures and pains: in short, they sympathize (1381a3-7).

Men are angry with friends (philoi), if they neither speak well or treat them well, and even more if ever they do the opposite. And if they fail to perceive those in need, as Antiphon's Plexippus with regard

to Meleager, for not to perceive is a sign of slight, for those to whom we pay heed do not escape notice. And with those who rejoice with respect to our misfortunes and with those who are generally cheerful with respect to our misfortunes, for this is a sign of enmity or slight. And with those who do not pay heed, if ever they give pain. Wherefore, men are angry with those who announce bad news. And with those who either listen concerning their affairs or observe their faults, for they resemble those who slight or are enemies: friends (philoi) share in suffering--and all men are distressed in observing their own faults.

Friendship involves a shared life. Thus, if a man accomplishes something, his friends share in his joy; if he is thwarted they share his sorrow (1381a2-5).²⁷ To be a friend to another, then, is to be linked to him, sharing his pain and his pleasure. When someone whom a man takes to be his friend does not sympathize with him when he experiences misfortune or consciously calls attention to his faults then their friendship is strained. Its shared aspect breaks down, and the man feels an injustice has been done. He feels slighted, desires revenge, and wishes to pass the pain he experiences to the one who has broken the bond of friendship.

Again, the reader is provided with an insight into goodwill. We have seen that Aristotle considers political communities as a species of friendship. Citizens in political communities have certain expectations about how fellow citizens should behave. Men expect fellow citizens to show a sort of commiseration in times of tribulation. To take an extreme example, men find those who are not pained by the sacrifices of fellow-citizens in times of war

disgusting. One may surmise that to demonstrate his goodwill a speaker must show a certain sympathy in grim times. A subsequent portion of the passage confirms this interpretation. Aristotle's example of men's anger at those who bring bad news must remind the reader of the predicament of the politician. He often bears bad news, and, as a result, he may be a target for anger because he seems to be unaffected by the pains that trouble ordinary citizens. A politician establishes himself to be of goodwill by showing a certain friendly sympathy to his fellow-citizens. This must surely elicit a certain trust on the part of men.²⁸

The importance of how men regard one another for understanding anger is also emphasized by Aristotle. He enumerates classes of men in the presence of whom men grow angry if they are slighted.

And further men are angry with those who slight them before five classes: those with whom they contend (philotimountai), those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, those before whom they are ashamed, and those who are ashamed before them: and if anyone slights them before these, their anger is greater.

It would probably be difficult to understand the significance of these classes without the clues Aristotle provides in his analysis of friendship. There, one finds that contention, admiration, and shame play a role in friendship (1381b10-14, 1381b18-23). These five categories all indicate a sharing of some notion of good and bad--which is the basis for friendship. To be slighted in front of those who share this notion is to be divorced from one's

friends, to lose their respect.

Aristotle ends his list of the objects of anger with some terse remarks that disclose the range of slights that can cause anger.

Men are also angry with those who slight such persons as it would be shameful for them not to defend: such as parents, children, wives and the ruled. And with those who do not render thanks, for the slight is contrary to what is fitting. And with those who employ irony and with respect to those who are serious, for irony is contempt. And with those who do good to others, if ever they do not do us well, for not deeming an individual worthy of the things given to all is contempt. Forgetfulness is also productive of anger: for instance, the forgetting of names even though it is a small matter, for forgetfulness seems to be a sign of slight. Forgetfulness produces a slight on account of indifference--indifference is slight.

A man becomes an object of anger for an action of some consequence: slighting those who are weak and in need of defence--an action that is disgusting. A man can also become an object of anger for something seemingly innocuous as employing irony or forgetting names. Of course, these are of no small importance, for as we have seen, men's self-esteem stems from their relations with others. If one is spoken to in an ironic fashion, one feels as though another may be flaunting his superiority. If one's name is forgotten by another this seems to be inattention that indicates lack of concern.

Aristotle then concludes his analysis of anger with a summary of what the analysis accomplishes.

It has been stated with whom men are angry, what are the dispositions of men who are angry, and on account of what sort of things men are angry. It is clear that it is necessary for a speaker, through

his speech, to put hearers into the frame of mind of those who are prone to anger, and show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse men to anger, and are people of the kind with whom men are angry.

The analysis of anger is of practical import and is meant to show how men can reason with the anger of those whom they wish to persuade. Studying the analysis one becomes aware of what must be said, i.e., demonstrated in speech, in order to rouse men's anger. The analysis, however, is clearly of theoretical import, as well. Throughout the analysis Aristotle presses his reader to think about various manifestations of anger and about how anger is important to an understanding of politics and persuasion.

Mildness

Aristotle's analysis of anger is a clearly delineated section of text meant, as Aristotle suggests, to introduce the reader of the Rhetoric to emotion. As it stands it cannot be regarded as complete, because anger has an opposite: mildness (praotēs). In order to more fully understand anger it is necessary to examine Aristotle's analysis of mildness, which immediately follows the analysis of anger. This examination will be confined to the details of the analysis that aid in contrasting anger and mildness.

Aristotle defines mildness this way. He says: "[1]et mildness be the settling down and quieting of anger" (1380a8-9).²⁹ Mildness, at least here, presupposes a previous angry state. Aristotle stresses that a speaker may

find his audience already angry and may have to appease their anger. Therefore, Aristotle provides grounds for a speaker to reason with his hearers, showing them their anger is unjustified. For instance, Aristotle says this:

If then men are angry with those who slight them, and slight is voluntary, it is evident that they are mild towards those who do none of these things, or do them involuntarily, or at least appear to be such; and towards those who intended the opposite of what they have done, and all who behave in the same way to themselves, for no one is likely to slight himself (1380a9-14).

If a speaker finds an audience angry and bent on a course of action which he does not wish them to take, he must use reasons such as these in order to dissuade them.

The analysis of mildness also shows that the venting of anger in an act of revenge results in mildness. When men are pained by a slight and they take revenge--give pain to another--they find a pleasurable satisfaction. Seeing another in pain, their sense of justice is satisfied and they grow mild. Men are mild

towards those who admit and are sorry for a slight; for finding as it were, satisfaction in the pain the offenders feel at what they have done, men cease to be angry (1380a14-16, cf. 1380b5-12).

Thus, it would seem that a speaker, when he rouses an audience to anger, must hold out the possibility of relief from the pain that accompanies anger, i.e., the possibility of a return to a state of mildness.

As well, Aristotle implies there is an actual mild state from which anger is a deviation. Men can be routinely mild towards one another. For instance, Aristotle states

that men are mild towards

those who are serious with them when they are serious, for they think they are being treated seriously, not with contempt. And towards those who have rendered them greater services. And towards those who want something and deprecate their anger, for they are humbler. And towards those who refrain from insulting, mocking, or slighting anyone, or any good man, or those who resemble themselves (1380a26-31).

These sentences, and others, echo what is said in the analysis of anger and what is said in the analysis of friendship (cf. 1379a30-33, 1381a32-35). It would seem that the condition Aristotle's analysis of mildness describes is like the condition of friendship. He suggests, then, that growing angry is a movement away from friendship and becoming mild is a return to a condition of friendship.

A Summary of the Analysis

It is clear from this examination that Aristotle's analysis of anger provides much to ponder. Even disregarding many of the "tracks" one might follow in the analysis and concentrating on the more obvious political connotations therein, one finds that Aristotle leads his reader to no less than a rudimentary understanding of man's political nature. What emerges from the analysis, if one takes care to think about it in the light of politics, is something of a sketch of men's concerns--and how those concerns link them together in political life. Men look to others to help fulfill basic needs, to others for some sense of self-esteem, and to others for honor, and when they are not

satisfied they are angered. That anger, quite clearly, is in need of guidance. The reader must sense a certain tension running through the analysis of anger. At one turn anger is right, proper, and decent. But at the next, one is reminded that men are prone to grow angry though they may not have reason to.

The analysis of anger demonstrates that anger is an essential part of political life. Throughout the analysis we see that anger stems from a friendly relation of men with others. In those times when men live harmoniously, they are friendly or mild towards one another. Their expectations are met. But when something goes awry and someone feels they have not received their just due from others, then there is a disruption and, as a consequence, anger. Aristotle suggests, then, that men will not, and should not, tolerate injustice. He suggests further that revenge may be a necessary feature of political life. Revenge may be necessary because men, by nature, have a taste for it, and because the health of political communities may depend on the venting of anger in acts of revenge. To put the matter as simply as possible, anger that is not vented in sanctioned acts of revenge may ultimately be vented in acts of a destructive character.³⁰ A speaker may have to persuade men to take revenge and guide their doing so.

But the analysis also teaches that anger can be problematic. There is a certain hastiness to anger. Men have a tendency to lash out when they are angry. Or, they may

misdirect their anger and impute responsibility for some problem to one who is not responsible. When men are dissatisfied they lay the blame for their dissatisfaction on one who is not responsible. This blame can even be, as the reader learns from the analysis, laid on politicians. A speaker may be required to show men that their anger is unjustified.

To lead men effectively, then, a man must reason with other men's emotions. This is, of course, no simple matter. That a politician must win men's trust indicates something important about the spirited, emotional part of men's souls--the part which prompts their concern for self, their own, and to some lesser extent their political community. That part also prompts them to look with suspicion upon others. They look with suspicion on strangers, outsiders, and foreigners. One is reminded that men also occasionally look with a certain suspicion on those who lead. Men worry that they may be led astray by political leaders.³¹ As the analysis shows, a speaker must demonstrate a sort of friendliness towards those he seeks to persuade. He must secure their trust through the establishment of his goodwill.

Studying the analysis of anger one begins to appreciate the very real problem the politician faces. Men's anger betrays a certain limit of perspective. They care primarily about themselves and about their own. Their concerns, however, can only be fulfilled inside the confines of their

community in a collective enterprise--an enterprise that may not lead to any immediate satisfaction of those concerns. The politician must be able to persuade men to put that collective enterprise ahead of their concern for their own satisfaction. One, thus, begins to appreciate the need for persuasion in politics and the need for the cultivation and teaching of rhetoric.

But, as yet, we have not dealt completely with the analysis. It is necessary, now, to turn our attention to Achilles (a very angry man), and to Socrates (a man possessed of an uncanny ability to make men angry).

Angry Achilles and the Gods

In the foregoing exegesis of Aristotle's analysis of anger it was observed that the Achilles of Homer's Iliad plays a prominent role and is of some significance for understanding the analysis of anger. It might be objected that Achilles' presence in the Rhetoric is more easily explained. The objection would run as follows. A writer is likely to employ examples, especially those known to his audience, in order to make an argument clear. The Iliad was well known by the Greeks of Aristotle's time. Hence, it should not be surprising that Aristotle refers to Achilles and quotes from that text by way of example. Such an explanation of Aristotle's method of writing is, however, somewhat facile. Aristotle wrote not only for his own age but for ages to come. Moreover, he wrote on subjects which

dictated he not reveal candidly all his thoughts: to do so would have invited persecution. If Aristotle's reader makes an effort and delves into the Iliad, looking especially to the contexts of Aristotle's citations, he finds that he is in possession of a gloss on the text that adds something to his appreciation of the analysis of anger. The context of a quotation may stand in contrast to what Aristotle says and thus provide an alternative view, or the context may call attention to passages crucial to understanding the Iliad. The reader, in this way, uncovers a deeper teaching concerning anger. Here, it would be impossible to come to any final conclusion regarding what Aristotle wishes his reader to learn from the allusions to Achilles or the quotations from the Iliad. It is, however, possible to say something modest about the significance of the Homeric Achilles to Aristotle's account of anger.

Reflection on Achilles' role in the Rhetoric necessitates an unsavory task: the pillage of the Iliad, a book itself deserving lengthy and careful study, for the barest details of his story. The precis included here will necessarily vulgarize Homer's portrayal of Achilles in the Iliad. Nonetheless, it should supply sufficient detail to speak of Achilles and persuasion. Let us turn now to the quotations cited by Aristotle in the analysis of anger, following the order of events in the Iliad.³²

The Achaians, led and ruled by Agamemnon, besiege the city of Troy. In the ninth year of their siege, the year in

which the action of the Iliad takes place, the Achaians are struck by a plague sent by Apollo, who seeks revenge against Agamemnon. Apollo does so because Agamemnon holds in captivity a girl named Chryseis, the daughter of Chryses, a Trojan priest loyal to Apollo, and refuses to return her, though the priest is willing to pay ransom. Achilles, who is the greatest warrior among the Achaians, intervenes. He induces an Achaian seer, Kalchas, whom he promises to protect, to speak in the Achaian assembly of what is required in order to stop the plague. Its abatement, according to Kalchas, depends on the return of Chryseis to her father. This will appease Apollo. His suggestion sets the famous quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles in motion.

The fourth and fifth quotations cited in the analysis take the reader to the beginning of the Iliad and the beginning of that quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon. Odysseus, warning the Achaians not to leave the siege of Troy, and so incur Agamemnon's anger, says "[g]reat is the spirit of kings nourished by Zeus, . . ."³³ And Kalchas, the seer who advises Agamemnon to return the girl Chryses to her father in order to appease Apollo and end the plague, expresses his concern over Agamemnon's anger. He is concerned that ". . . , even afterwards he holds a grudge, . . ."³⁴ These quotations, then, point to the destructive quarrels that can erupt in the political realm. Agamemnon proves himself a poor leader. A better leader might be less concerned with honor and less prone to anger.³⁵

Agamemnon returns the girl to Chryses, but he is angered by Achilles' interference, which has resulted in his being dishonored. To reassert his position as leader of the Achaians and take revenge on Achilles he demands one of Achilles' captive prizes--the girl Briseis. Achilles, in turn, feels himself dishonored and this leads him to seek revenge. He withdraws from the battle with the Trojans and makes a prayer to Zeus, mediated by his immortal mother, Thetis, for Zeus to wreak destruction on the Achaians. His hope is that the destruction, to which he is callously indifferent, will show how necessary he is to Achaian cause and will force Agamemnon to accord him the honor he believes is his due. What Achilles prays for is realized. The Trojans fight their way out of the city to the ships of the Achaians. Agamemnon repents and is willing to return Briseis as well as to give other gifts to Achilles if he rejoins the battle. Agamemnon dispatches three of the leading men of the Achaians--Odysseus, Phoinix, and Aias--with this offer, hoping they will be able to persuade Achilles. Their varied attempts fail and Achilles does not return even though what he prayed for has been realized.

The second and third quotations from the analysis are cited as evidence of honor's being an essential aspect of insult. With these quotations the reader is taken to one of the most important sections of the Iliad and is shown something crucial about Achilles, anger, and persuasion. Again, the passages Aristotle cites seem simply to support

his point. But checking the context of the quotations, one may surmise that Aristotle wishes his reader to see a contrast between Achilles as he is in the first quotation (which is drawn from Book One of the Iliad) and as he is in the second (which is drawn from Book Nine)--where his comrades try to persuade him. In the quotation drawn from Book One Achilles, after Agamemnon siezes Briseis, exclaims: "he has dishonored me for by taking he, himself, has my prize."³⁶ In the quotation drawn from Book Nine Achilles dismisses Aias' attempt, following the attempts of Odysseus and Phoinix, to persuade him to return to the fight and push back the Trojans. He says he has been treated "like some dishonored vagrant."³⁷ Aristotle's juxtaposition of these quotations is significant. Taken together and out of context they might lead one to think that the loss of Briseis is Achilles' dishonor, and think that her restoration would entail the restoration of his honor. This is not the case. The context of the second quotation shows that the restoration of Briseis and other forms of recompense--goods and glory--offered by Odysseus and the warnings about ruin by Phoinix are insufficient to bring Achilles back to the battle.³⁸ Nor is Aias' diatribe about Achilles' disregard for friendship sufficient--though Achilles admits its justness.³⁹

What must be said about these two passages is that they contrast a confident Achilles and a troubled Achilles. He withdraws from the battle sensing himself dishonored,

praying, hoping, and perhaps even expecting Zeus to punish Agamemnon's insult. But this situation demands that Achilles ask a question: if he is, in fact, the greatest warrior and favored by Zeus, why has Zeus allowed him to be dishonored? He reasons in this fashion. Believing he is the best man among the Achaians, he believes he is favored by Zeus. As a consequence, he believes he should have the most honor. In his confrontation with Agamemnon he realizes that Zeus does not accord him the highest honor. This realization seems to precipitate a crisis of faith. He no longer believes that the hero's life is worth living. All men, he realizes, are in some sense, equal: they all die. Zeus accords no one a privileged place in the cosmos. Achilles is led to make a choice. His mother has prophesied that he will either leave the siege and enjoy a long happy life or remain and suffer unhappiness and die, but still attain great glory. He rejects glory and declares to his comrades that he will renounce the life of the hero and sail back to his homeland to a long and happy life.⁴⁰

But, then, something unforeseen occurs. Achilles' beloved companion, Patroklos, who has also withdrawn from the battle, goes to the aid of the Achaians. In the combat that ensues Patroklos is killed by Hector, the foremost man among the Trojans. The first quotation from the Iliad that Aristotle cites in the analysis he adduces as evidence of the pleasure of anger. Achilles says "far sweeter than honey that drips / it flourishes in the hearts of men."⁴¹ Looking

to the context from which the quotation is drawn, Aristotle's reader is apprised of a somewhat different story. Achilles speaks of the pleasure of anger before his mother, Thetis, while lamenting the death of his friend Patroklos. He admits that anger, while pleasurable, hinders counsel, indicating that counsel may have prevented Patroklos' death. The destruction he has forced on the Achaians has resulted in the death of his closest friend. The context of the citation intimates that anger can be a destructive force requiring guidance. The problem that the passage points to is that men make unreasonable claims in the political realm when they are angry. As a result they themselves may, as Achilles did, suffer bittersweet consequences; and those around them may suffer worse, as the Achaians did during Achilles' absence from the battle (cf. 1359a2-5, 1366b36-38).

To complete, after a fashion, Achilles' story this may be said. He, distraught at the loss of his friend, forgets his anger at Agamemnon, which is supplanted, in a sense, by anger at Hector. Achilles is reconciled with Agamemnon, returns to the battle, and kills Hector. He remains to fight, and so lives out the glorious fate prophesied for him by his mother.

Aristotle points to a deeper teaching in Homer, a teaching that eluded his contemporaries, and which eludes today's readers of the Iliad. With this attention to Achilles, Aristotle makes a delicate suggestion, for

speaking speculatively of religious matters is, or at least once was, a delicate matter. Aristotle asks his reader to consider the relation of men's anger to a belief in gods that reward and punish.⁴² He suggests that pondering men's belief in gods and the role of that belief in political life is requisite to understanding anger. More specifically, he demands his reader consider the relationship of anger to a belief in gods in light of the extraordinary circumstances that render a man such as Achilles unpersuadable.⁴³

In Achilles the reader sees a man who takes the circumstances that confront him to their "logical" conclusion. As a result he suffers a loss of faith and a loss of hope. For a very short time he spurns the hero's life and the claims of friendship in favour of a life of comfort. It would seem that Achilles' story suggests that man's emotional nature and his very willingness to act for the sake of others is somehow tied to the belief in gods.

Some reflection on Aristotle's text reveals that one may be right in thinking that there are connections between anger, the emotions, and belief. Men who are blessed by fortune, and this would surely include Achilles, stand in a certain relation to the gods. Aristotle states that fortunate men, though prone to arrogance and thoughtlessness, acquire one good quality:

[f]ortunate men stand in a certain relation to the divinity and are lovers of the gods (philotheoi), trusting in them owing to the benefits they have received from fortune (1391a33-b2).

When men feel that they have been done injustice they grow

angry, and, according to Aristotle, grow daring. This action is linked to a belief in gods. Men are daring

if it is well with [them] in regard to the gods, especially as to intimations from signs and oracles and everything else of the kind; for anger inspires daring, and it is the injustice that [they] suffer and not that which [they] inflict upon others that causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist those who are done injustice (1383b4-8).

This anger is evident in men's swearing. They swear and invoke gods when they are angry. They expect the gods to be angry at injustice. Men look, then, with hope to the gods to assist them in dealing with injustice. Further evidence of this is found in the fact that men ascribe the emotion of indignation to the gods. Speaking of pity and indignation Aristotle says that

both these emotions show good character, for if we sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who prosper undeservedly; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods (1386b14-15).

Here, the reader sees that the gods are not only supporters of justice, but may also exact justice themselves. Men fear the anger, and the indignation, of gods who judge of their behaviour in this life.

Aristotle confirms, albeit with some circumspection, that man's anger and consequent demands for revenge, and indeed his emotional nature, are linked to man's religious nature: to his belief in the existence of gods and an afterlife. Most men, like Achilles, yearn for justice when they are angry. They look to the gods expecting them to support their quest for justice, or look to the gods to

punish injustice themselves. These expectations issue in certain very human hopes. Men hope, as Achilles did, that the gods will punish injustice. And their hopes extend to something beyond this life. They hope they will be rewarded in the afterlife for their just deeds, and they hope that those who have done injustice will be punished.⁴⁴ Aristotle delicately suggests, then, that men's anger, and ultimately their willingness to act and take revenge stems from a faith in the gods--or something like a faith in the gods.⁴⁵

Aristotle's carefully chosen quotations from the Iliad, thus, take the reader to a deeper appreciation of anger and politics. His attention to Achilles shows that anger and hope are, in a sense, expressions of man's higher longings. Anger and hope express a longing for an eternal, just order. The attention to Achilles also reminds the reader that that longing must be guided lest it issue in destruction. This digression, then, underlines the necessity for persuasion in politics.

Socrates and the Angry Athenians

It was noted in the exegesis of the analysis of anger that there is another figure present in the Rhetoric: that of the Platonic Socrates. It was proposed that he, as well as Achilles, would help the reader understand anger. Again, the objection might be made that this is simply a matter of Aristotle's choosing ready examples, or, that it may be a matter of influence, as Plato was Aristotle's teacher and

Aristotle studied at the Platonic Academy for no less than twenty years.⁴⁶ It should, on this account, be of little wonder that the reader finds references--both explicit and implicit--to the Platonic dialogues in the Rhetoric. But again, careful attention to the text proves this wrong. Certain portions of the Rhetoric, as we have seen, make the reader think of the Apology. Moving from Aristotle's analysis of anger to the Apology, the reader is supplied with a further gloss on that analysis. The study of the analysis of anger in conjunction with the Apology provides insights into anger and persuasion. But in order to gain those insights, an unsavory task is made necessary for a second time: in this instance, the pillage of the Apology.

Plato's Apology is a dramatic dialogue that portrays Socrates' defence speech before a jury of his fellow Athenians after being indicted on the charge of doing "injustice by corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other daimonia that are new" (24b-c).⁴⁷ The dialogue is divided into three parts: the first, the defence speech proper, is an answer to those charges; the second, made after Socrates is convicted, is a counter-proposal to the death penalty specified in the indictment; and the third, made after the death penalty has been pronounced, is an address to the jurors before he is incarcerated to await his execution. While certain contemporary commentators might argue otherwise, Socrates is not seriously concerned with acquittal.⁴⁸ In fact, the more

one becomes familiar with the dialogue the more one realizes that Socrates makes his speech in a fashion calculated to secure a conviction and the imposition of the death penalty. The reason? Quite possibly because he could no longer lead the life he wished to and, perhaps as well, because the act of dying for his "cause," i.e., for philosophy, would engender a respect for philosophy thereafter.⁴⁹ How does Socrates accomplish his intention? Without presuming to understand all of Socrates' rhetorical skills, one may say this much. His defence speech is a rhetorical performance par excellence in which he does the opposite of what might be expected in a defence speech. He rouses the anger of his jurors, and as one discovers, he does so with an almost single-minded zeal. In order to demonstrate that Socrates' address is meant to anger his jurors it is perhaps best to look briefly at the Apology in light of Aristotle's characterization of the three forms of slight: contempt, spite, and insult.

Aristotle states in his analysis of anger that contempt follows from an indication that one believes something to be unworthy of consideration. There, he states that irony is contemptuous. In this public defence of himself Socrates' irony is annoyingly evident. We may cite two obvious examples. He claims he is no teacher yet adopts a noticeable pedagogic tone throughout his speech (19d-20e, 33b; cf. 28d-29a, 30d-31b, 36c). And, he denies that he is a clever speaker, yet he employs arguments in a cross-examination of

one of his accusers that must appear to the jurors as sophistical (17b; cf. 24d-28a). Socrates, however, does not confine his contempt to irony. Throughout his speech, he heaps scorn on the assembled jurors, contemning their concerns, especially their political concerns. In the course of his speech he teaches them that he, in some way, is wiser than the politicians that many of the jurors must revere (21b-c). He reminds them he is in the habit of examining those who claim to "possess virtue" to see whether, in fact, they do, and, he reminds them that he finds men lacking. He indicates to the jurors that his fellow citizens "care for having as much money as possible, and reputation, and honor, . . ." or "care about bodies and money" rather than virtue (29d-c, 30a-b). Making a pointed contrast between himself and his jurors, he asks this contemptuous question:

[w]hat am I worthy to suffer or to pay, just because I did not keep quiet during my life and did not care for the things the many do--money-making and management of the household, and generalships, and public oratory, and the other offices and conspiracies and the factions that come to be in the city--because I held that I was really too decent to survive if I went into these things? (36b-c).

Socrates, in his speech, then, identifies those things that most men do believe to be important and pointedly displays his contempt for them.

It would not be far from wrong to say that the jurors probably wish Socrates to admit his guilt and repent, and come back to the political fold. Socrates does not take that course. He displays a pointed contempt for the form of behaviour expected of a man pleading his defence. At one

point in the speech Socrates invents a dialogue between himself and the jurors that captures one aspect of this contempt. He says

. . .--if you would say to me with regard to this, "Socrates, for now we will not obey Anytus; we will let you go, but on this condition: that you no longer spend time in this investigation nor philosophize; and if you are caught still doing this, you will die"--if you would let me go, then, as I said, on these conditions, I would say to you, "I salute you and cherish you, men of Athens, but I will obey the god rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able to, I will not stop philosophizing, . . . (29c-d).

And in his speech he calls attention, in a more concrete way, to his contempt for judicial nicety. Socrates knows what the jury wants, but he refuses to give it.

Perhaps someone among you may be vexed when he recalls himself, if, in contesting a trial even smaller than this trial, he begged and supplicated the judges with many tears, bringing forward his own children and many others of his family and friends, so as to be pitied as much as possible, while I will do none of these things, although in this I am risking, as I might seem, the extreme danger. Perhaps, then, someone thinking about this may be rather stubborn toward me, and angered by this, he may set down his vote in anger (34b-34d).

Well the juror might. Socrates' contempt does not end with the main part of his defence speech. It could probably be said that the jurors would prefer for him to make a reasonable counter-proposal to the death penalty specified by the indictment once they have convicted him. Again he shows his contempt for the prudent course by making proposals that are clearly meant to anger, for all will mean him no pain. By doing so, he stresses his unrepentant attitude. The first penalty, which he thinks he deserves on

account of his service to the city, is to be given his meals at the prytaneum: an honor usually reserved for Olympic champions (36b-37a).⁵⁰ Not only would this not be painful for Socrates, he might count it as a positive good. It would free him from any worry about sustenance, leaving him to his philosophic concerns. The other two penalties he proposes are penalties of money (38b). The first, one mina of silver, will not harm him because he can afford to pay it. The second, thirty minae of silver, which Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus guarantee, will not harm him or his friends, for they will pay and, presumably, they can afford to do so. Even in the third and final part of the dialogue, after his conviction and sentencing, Socrates reminds the jurors of his contempt, mentioning that he is convicted

for not being willing to say the sorts of things to you that you would have been most pleased to hear: me wailing and lamenting, and doing and saying many other things unworthy of me, as I affirm--such things as you have been accustomed to hear from others (38d-e).

To the very end, then, Socrates must appear to his jurors to be contemptuous.

Generally, in the Apology Socrates looks down upon the political realm: he sees it as corrupting, not to say, positively dangerous (31d-32a). Socrates, however, does make it abundantly clear what he thinks is important, and that is philosophizing. In his speech, Socrates accents the gulf between himself and the jurors, holding up his leisurely, untroubled, and pleasurable, pursuit of wisdom as the very

model of a good and decent life (cf. 23c, 33a-c, 37c-38a). Sitting in judgement of Socrates, would not almost any Athenian juror feel himself an object of contempt?

Socrates is also spiteful. The essence of spite, according to Aristotle, is obstructing another's wishes for the sake of pleasure. Socrates actually reminds the jurors of his obstruction of the Athenian judicial process. He states again and again that he does not fear death while most men do. An imaginary questioner asks him this question.

Perhaps, then, someone might say, "Then are you not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed the sort of pursuit from which you now run the risk of dying?"
 . . . (28b).

His lengthy response, which alludes to Achilles, contains these lines.⁵¹

Wherever someone stations himself, holding that it is best, or wherever he is stationed by a ruler, there he must remain and run the risk, as it seems to me, and not take into account death or anything else before what is shameful (28d-e).

As a demonstration of his not fearing death he speaks of certain exemplary deeds. They are not of the kind one would usually offer in one's defence. In the first case he opposed the trial of ten generals.

I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the city except for being once on the council. And it happened that our tribe (Antiochos) held the prytany when you wished to judge the ten generals (the ones who did not pick up the men from the naval battle) as a group--contrary to law, as it seemed to you all in the time afterwards. I alone of the prytanes opposed your doing anything against the laws then, and I voted against it. And although the orators were ready to indict me and arrest me, and you were ordering and shouting, I supposed that I should run the risk on the side of the law and justice rather than go along with you because of fear of prison or

death, when you were counseling injustice (32b-c).

In the second case he would not follow an order to undertake an arrest.

But, again, when the oligarchy came to be, the Thirty summoned myself and four others into the Tholos, and they ordered us to arrest Leon the Salaminian and bring him from Salamis to die. They ordered many others to do things of this sort, wishing that as many as possible would be implicated in the responsibility. Then, however, I showed again, not in speech but in deed, that I do not care about death in any way at all--if it is not too crude to say so--but that my only care is to commit no unjust or impious deed. That rule, as strong as it was, did not shock me into doing anything unjust. When we came out of the Tholos, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I departed and went home (32c-d).

In both these instances he reminds the jurors that besides being capable of not fearing death, he is also capable of obstructing the judicial process in his own city. He reminds the jurors, then, of behaviour that they might regard as spiteful. Truly an extraordinary measure in a defence speech.

The reader of the dialogue finds, as well, that Socrates insults at least some of the jurors he addresses. Insult, Aristotle observes, is "injury or pain whereby there is shame for the sufferer" (Rhetoric 1378b23-25). Socrates may well induce shame in some of the jurors, for he implies some of them have behaved shamefully. In the first part of the speech Socrates lays the basis for the most vicious of insults--at least the most vicious that can be directed at a man, as he suggests some of the jurors are cowards. He speaks at length, as we have seen, of the fact he himself

does not fear death. Near the very end of his speech, that point at which--one suspects--someone speaking in defence of himself would want especially to placate a jury, Socrates delivers his coup de grâce (consider Rhetoric 1415a25-38). He reminds some of the jurors of their shameful behaviour when they, themselves, appeared in court, and were confronted by the possibility of death. He claims that some of them, by their cowardly behaviour, prove themselves to be no better than women.

I have often seen such men when they are judged who, although they are reputed to be something, do amazing deeds, since they suppose they suffer something terrible if they die--as though they would be deathless if you did not kill them. They seem to be to attach shame to the city so that anyone, even a foreigner, would assume that those Athenians who are distinguished in virtue--the ones whom they pick out from among themselves for their offices and other honors--are not distinguished from women. For those of you, men of Athens, who are reputed to be something in any way at all, should not do these things; nor whenever we do them should you allow it. Instead, you should show that you would much rather vote to convict the one who brings in these piteous dramas and makes the city ridiculous, than the one who keeps quiet (33a-b).

It would seem nearly impossible for a man--a real man--to listen to such a speech and remain unaffected. Socrates, then, delivers insults, as well.^{5 2}

The extracts from the dialogue cited here attest to the fact that Socrates spoke so as to rouse the anger of his jurors. And angered they were. Throughout the dialogue the reader finds evidence that Socrates, in spite of his warnings to the jurors that they should not be angry or "make a disturbance," is achieving the rhetorical effect he

desired: he must ask the jurors to be quiet on more than occasion in order that he may continue to speak (17c, 20d-e, 30c, 31e; cf. 21a, 27a-b, 30c).⁵³ As the immediate consequence of Socrates' anger-rousing speech they sought revenge, convicting him and sentencing him to death. Clearly Socrates sought a conviction and the death penalty. His "reverse" rhetoric helped to secure his goals.

But how does this reverse rhetoric work? Why is Socrates' speech so terribly effective? Though Socrates makes a number of claims concerning his civic-minded service to the city of Athens, what emerges from the study of the dialogue is that something larger is at work in the defence. The drama of the dialogue is not what it first seems. In the dialogue one sees a confrontation between Socrates the philosopher and the very nature of political communities, not a confrontation between Socrates the citizen and Athens. Socrates "defence" speech must be considered as an attack--sometimes veiled and sometimes not so veiled--on political life itself. In this confrontation of philosophy and politics Socrates attacks much of what is held dear by men in the political realm: from the pleasures of the body through the honors that derive from holding political office. He attacks precisely those things Aristotle suggests the political speaker must attend to (Rhetoric 1360b4-1362a14). And he refuses to play by the political community's rules when he pleads his defence. Prudence dictates that a man pleading a defence express regret.

Jurors would look upon this with favour. Socrates does not do this. He, thus, does exactly the opposite of what will, according to Aristotle, placate anger (Rhetoric 1380a14-27). His speech, then, is not so much calculated to anger but one group or class in Athens. It includes something to anger almost anyone.^{5 4}

But what does one learn about politics and persuasion by looking at Plato's Apology in light of Aristotle's analysis of anger? In the preceding look at Aristotle's analysis it became apparent that men have certain concerns--concerns which they expect to be satisfied by others. This forces politicians to speak so as to elicit the trust of men. They must acknowledge other men's concerns, and thereby establish their goodwill. Turning to the Apology one finds an odd confirmation of this view. Socrates' unfriendly attitude, springing from his uncompromising stance, establishes him not as a man of goodwill, but as a monster of ill-will. From Socrates' impolite speech we learn about the emotional horizon of political communities that the politician must respect.

The men who attempt to lead in political communities may, as Socrates does in the Apology, become objects of anger. Philosophers are not at all like politicians, except for the fact that they may be regarded with some suspicion by the majority of men: philosophers because they are believed to be useless or pernicious; politicians because they are believed capable of abusing their power.

Philosophers, however, do not always speak as Socrates did in the Apology. They, it seems, speak somewhat more politely. And no politician would speak as Socrates did. Both philosophers and politicians must, for safety's sake or for the sake of accomplishing what they seek to accomplish, speak politely, or politically.⁵⁵ This digression underlines the fact there is an emotional horizon within which the rhetorical speaker must speak.

Anger, Goodwill, and Friendship: A Synthesis

The study of anger provides startling illumination of the nature of political communities. From the study of the analysis of anger and the subsequent digressions it becomes clear that the relationship of the members of a political community must be understood as one of friendship. As Aristotle implies in the Rhetoric and certain of his other works, man's nature involves him in relations with others looking to satisfy his concerns, and ultimately involves him in a particular community. Politics, as Aristotle presents it in the analysis of anger is, or should, be a matter of "us" and "them," "them" being foreigners, outsiders, the enemy. This "usness" of political friendship is the basis of anger. Anger, stated simply, springs from friendship and is most often felt with regard to friends--or fellow citizens.⁵⁶

It is this realization that clarifies the nature of anger and what role it must play in persuasion. Men regard

their fellows as extensions of themselves. In every political community there are expectations as to the behaviour, duties, obligations of citizens. If a man does not do what is expected of him, he becomes an object of other people's anger. He has ceased to properly participate in the shared friendly life of his community. A man who murders another takes from the community. His fellows are justly angry with him. A man who refuses to join in the defence of his community becomes an object of anger because he unjustly refuses to help preserve the community even though he is one of its members. When a man does not conform to the expectations of his community, other men perceive the fact and experience a sort of pain: anger. Experiencing anger they desire revenge, i.e., they desire to inflict pain, for the sake of their own satisfaction, on the one who has caused them pain. Anger and its appeasement through revenge are an inescapable feature of political life.

The analysis of anger shows and the digression on Achilles reminds the reader of the Rhetoric that the quest for revenge and justice, however noble, may result in unfortunate consequences--even injustice--because anger can overwhelm reason (cf. 1367a20-22, 1370b30-32, 1372a2-4). It is clear that anger, if it is to be satisfied in a manner conducive to the good of the political community must be guided by reasonable, enthymematic speech.⁵⁷ The powerful speaker, on Aristotle's model, must arm himself with materials for speeches drawn from the analysis of anger and

other parts of the text in order to be able to reason with men's emotions. Aristotle thus elaborates a manner of rousing emotion that gives credence to something of the best in man: his sense of justice and his reason.

One might say, extrapolating from some of Aristotle's examples, that the one who persuades a political community must be something like a doctor ministering to a patient. A speaker might rouse and guide the anger of the members of a political community in order that a criminal be punished. Aristotle, when he discusses forensic rhetoric, suggests that such an action could be understood almost in terms of health. He states that "punishment and justice are kinds of remedies (iasis)" for those who suffer (1374b32).⁵⁸ Or perhaps more accurately, revenge is the remedy. As Aristotle says:

there is a difference between revenge and punishment; the latter is inflicted in the interest of the one who suffers the punishment, the former in the interest of him who inflicts it, that he may obtain satisfaction (1369b12-14).

And, of course, the opposite is true. A speaker may be faced with having to dissuade people from acting rashly and exacting revenge when they should not. It goes without saying that these appeals to men's emotions must be seen in contradistinction to what must be regarded as the unreasoning appeals to the emotions favored by the technologists whom Aristotle criticizes at the outset of his treatise.⁵⁹

Thinking of the emotions in terms of pleasure and pain, and of the politician as a sort of doctor of the body politic, gives the reader some insight into the exemplary status of anger in the Rhetoric. Anger is a longing accompanied by pain. To move men to judge or act by reasoning with their emotions, it is necessary to cause them a certain sort of pain, from which they may find healthy release in their judgement or action. This is seen most clearly in Aristotle's comparison of indignation and envy. There he states:

it is evident that these emotions will be accompanied by opposite emotions; for he who is pained at the sight of those who are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at least not be pained at the sight of those who are deservedly so; for instance, no good man would be pained at seeing revenge taken on parricides or assassins; we should rather rejoice at their lot, and at that of men who are deservedly fortunate; for both these are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because he cannot help hoping that what has happened to his like may also happen to himself (1386b25-33).

And that

if the envious man is pained at another's possession or acquisition of good fortune, he is bound to rejoice at the destruction or non-acquisition of the same (1387a1-3).

An examination of the remaining emotions enumerated in Book Two reveals almost all of them to be enumerated as pains (1382a20-22, 1383b11-15, 1385b10-16, 1387b22-25, 1388b22-28).⁶⁰ A speaker must learn, then, to pain men and show them a way they may be released from their pain.

It is from the analysis of anger that the reader also acquires an understanding of what Aristotle terms goodwill.

In the analysis Aristotle reminds the reader that the very men who must persuade others are viewed with a certain suspicion and may actually become objects of anger for the citizens of a political community. This is so, because politicians set the course for political communities. They suggest policies, make promises about what their policies will bring. Expectations are the result. If what is promised does not materialize, those with expectations are angry, and the man who raised their expectations becomes an object of anger. Just as men are wont to grow angry with their more immediate fellows, they are wont to grow angry with politicians. And, for the same reasons. In both instances men perceive a breakdown of the friendship of the political community. For the politician is held responsible for whatever pain accrues to the men he leads.⁶¹ He may seem unsympathetic. He does not seem to--and may not--share their pain. He may be perceived as abusing his power. The result is anger, and a desire for revenge.

For a man to persuade it is necessary to win the trust of his hearers. As one learns from Aristotle's analysis of anger and the analysis of friendship this is accomplished by seeming to be a friend of those one wishes to persuade: for instance, to have the same loves and hates, and grow angry at the same slights. In the passage that led us to consider the quality of goodwill, Aristotle observed that though it might appear from a speech that a man was prudent and would render advice, he must also appear to have the third quality

of goodwill. For a politician to take pains to establish that he cares for others, the way fellow citizens care for one another, adds something crucial to speech-making.

But this constitutes only a rough sketch of goodwill. What has been said thus far requires detail. Goodwill, as has been stressed, stems from a demonstrated friendliness towards other men. The characterization of this friendliness has been somewhat ambiguous. In some cases that friendliness seems to involve showing concern for what the majority of men in any political community would be concerned about. We have noted, as well, however, that different political communities may be animated by different notions of good and bad, different ideas of justice. Men may love the same thing in a political community: for instance, freedom in a democracy. Their political friendship would be influenced accordingly. Does this mean that goodwill is conditioned by the community a speaker addresses, or is goodwill somehow universal?

Goodwill may stem from the demonstrated care for what the majority of men take to be important. This group--the many, or hoi polloi, to use the most common epithet--are present in any regime and must be persuaded for the sake of concerted action in a political community. As Carnes Lord states:

[r]hetoric is the method of communication of politicians. More precisely, it is the method of communication of the political elite with the political mass, 'the many'; its character is determined above all by the requirements of persuading the mass.⁶²

Lord is also quick to point out that while this "view of the character and purpose of rhetoric, . . ." is not developed by Aristotle it "appears nevertheless to be assumed by him throughout."⁶³ Reading the Rhetoric closely one does indeed find that "the many" are a focus. Aristotle, in enumerating materials for arguments, will often indicate that their basis is in what the majority believe (see, for instance, 1361a25-27, 1363a7-10, 1364b37 - 1365a2, 1371a13-14, 1384a8-10, 1398b21-23). It is safe to conclude, though Aristotle never explicitly claims as much, that a speaker may demonstrate his goodwill by demonstrating his care for the universal concerns of the many--for their concerns are the same in any political community.

But the reader of the Rhetoric also learns that the demonstration of one's goodwill may be conditioned by the specific character of a community. When Aristotle speaks of different political communities, he makes statements that suggest as much. The brief discussion of different sorts of communities he provides begins with these words.

. . . ; but the most important and the strongest of all the means of persuasion and good counsel is to know all the constitutions, and the habits, laws, and interests of each; for all men are guided by by considerations of expediency, and that which preserves the constitution is expedient (1365b21-25).

Aristotle shows that different communities prize different things, e.g., freedom, wealth, and education (1366a2-8). Thus, the speaker's political reasoning is necessarily bounded by the particular character of the community in

which he must persuade. Aristotle thus suggests that the speaker is constrained to speak in a certain way by the community he addresses. This constraint also effects persuasion through character. He also states the following:

But as proofs are established not only by demonstrative speech but also through character--since we have confidence in a speaker who exhibits certain qualities, such as goodness, goodwill, or both--it follows that we ought to be acquainted with the characters of each form of government; for in reference to each, the character most likely to persuade must be that which is characteristic of it (1366a8-14).

In this instance, one cannot help but note the conspicuous use of the word "goodwill." The powerful speaker demonstrates his goodwill by making speeches that indicate he is of a character like that of the men to whom he speaks. By doing so, he overcomes the natural suspicion of men and so gains their trust. This notion of tailoring of speeches to the particular emotional nature of a community also runs through the Rhetoric.⁴ Aristotle suggests repeatedly that in order to persuade, a man must observe the moral and emotional peculiarities of communities (for example, 1360a20-21, 1360a30-37, 1366b9-15, 1367a28-30, 1367b7-11, 1368b6-9, 1384a10-12, 1388b8-10, 1408a27-29, 1415b30-32).⁵ Adapting an old piece of proverbial wisdom, one might say that to persuade in Rome, one must speak, and feel, as the Romans do.

One last remark will complete the picture of goodwill. This quality, as Aristotle observes in his discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, should not be mistaken

for friendship itself.⁶⁶ It is not completely certain that a political man participates in the reciprocity of the political community.⁶⁷ Though he may be required to speak as though he shares the concerns of his fellows, he must view political life from a somewhat different perspective. Men, as one learns from the Rhetoric, are concerned with their own good, the good of their own, and to some degree with their larger political community. They have, however, a somewhat limited perspective. The politician must not be limited in his perspective. He must see to the good of the entire community.⁶⁸ He surely does not regard fellow citizens the way they regard each other--with their expectations. In order to persuade, however, he must at least seem to share some of their concerns. Thus, it is necessary for the man intent on persuading to adopt a politic, or polite mode of speech which disguises his distance from the concerns of other men.⁶⁹

It is possible to summarize the rudiments of Aristotle's teaching about rhetorical speaking in this fashion. The powerful speaker must make every effort to harmonize with the emotions of those he seeks to persuade. But it would be a great mistake to think that this is the only aim of a powerful speaker. Aristotle never counsels demagoguery. He does not suggest that a speaker give his hearers what they wish to hear. The aim of the man who seeks to persuade, as Aristotle envisions him, is to lead others. This means he must elicit the trust of those he seeks to

persuade so they will hearken to his reasoning. He harmonizes with the political community, then, in order that he may "call the tune."⁷⁰

Notes

1 Through this close commentary bracketed citations are omitted except where reference is made to other parts of the text or to other works. See Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning, pp. 115-116, on this tripartite analysis.

2 In this section, my changes to Freese's translation are somewhat more radical.

3 See Aristotle Problems 949b13-19. There, Aristotle states that ". . . , desires are generally speaking contrary to reason, but anger is combined with reason (meta logou) not because reason advises it but because it is reason which indicates the insult or criticism."

4 Aristotle mentions the name Cleon and perhaps means his reader to think of the Athenian demagogue, who was an object of anger (see also, 1408b24-26). Consider Thomas Hobbes, trans., Hobbes's Thucydides, ed. Richard Schlatter (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1975), pp. 260-261.

5 Iliad 18. 109.

6 Achilles, as far as I can ascertain, is mentioned by name fourteen times in the Rhetoric; whereas, he seems not to be mentioned by name in either the Politics or the Nicomachean Ethics.

7 While there so little space devoted to a discussion of contempt, it is mentioned many times in the text (for instance: 1371a15, 1379a35, 1379b6-8, 1379b30-32, 1380a21, 1380a27, 1381b20, 1384b23, 1388b22-26).

8 It is a well known fact that Thomas Hobbes held Aristotle's Rhetoric in high regard. See Lord, "Intention," p. 326. So much so, in fact, that he published a digest of the text. On its title-page Hobbes includes a quotation from one of Juvenal's Satires which suggests one should honor one's teacher above one's parents. An examination of the context from which the quotation is drawn reveals that immediately before the quotation Socrates is mentioned and immediately after Achilles is mentioned. Perhaps Hobbes also noted the importance of these two figures in the Rhetoric. See The English Work of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth, in Vol. 6: The Whole Art of Rhetoric (London: John Bohn, 1840), p. 419.

9 Socrates, I believe, is mentioned by name eleven times in the Rhetoric. Mentioning Socrates would not seem to suggest any specific Platonic dialogue, as he plays a role in almost

all of them. One finds, however, that some of references to Socrates make one think of the Apology. These particular references concern not only Socrates but also the gods: thus, they evoke thoughts about the charges brought against Socrates (cf. Apology 24b-c, 1398a15-27, 1399a7-10). But one reference in particular should make the reader think of the Apology. In his discussion of the use of interrogation, Aristotle employs as an example Socrates' interrogation of his accuser, Meletus, regarding the charge of religious innovation: a performance that certainly roused the anger of the jurors (cf. Apology 26a-28b, 1419a6-12). One should also note similarities between Socrates' opening remarks in the Apology and those of Aristotle in the Rhetoric regarding the ideal juror (cf. Apology 17b-18a, 1354a16-30): I am indebted to Pat Malcolmson for this observation. As to the importance of the Apology to an understanding of the Rhetoric see Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning, pp. 147-154.

10 This brief sentence, stressing the advantages of friendship, captures the essential character of the presentation of friendship throughout the Rhetoric, but chiefly in the discussion of the objects of anger and in the analysis of friendship itself. See Aristotle's prior allusions to friendship (1361b35-38, 1362b19-20). Aristotle may provide a deeper insight into spite by mentioning fear and friendship. Men, according to Aristotle, are not spiteful towards those whom they fear or those from whom they might derive some benefit. How is the man who does not fear and who has no need for others regarded by the majority of men? Aristotle asserts that men are friendly towards those like themselves (1381b14-16). Do not men have a desire that others be like them? Or to state the matter more sharply, do they not have a desire to reduce men to their level? A man who does not fear what others do and does not need others could appear to be a spiteful, for men wish that others be like them. This propensity may explain envy (1387b25-28). In this regard, the account of envy begs to be contrasted with the accounts of shame and emulation (1384a6-13, 1388a32-36).

11 Nicomachean Ethics 1149a23-1149b3, and Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning, pp. 116-117.

12 By mentioning the rich and young, Aristotle may suggest common targets for men's anger.

13 Iliad 1. 356.

14 Ibid., 9. 648.

15 Here, Aristotle suggests what animates the rhetorician. His attraction to rhetoric is born of a desire for honor (cf. 1354b22-27, 1356a25-35, 1371a3-10).

16 Iliad 2. 196.

17 Ibid., 1. 82.

18 In this passage Aristotle conflates desire and emotion. Again, a textual oddity that demands thought (cf. 1388b32-34). Throughout the text he places equivocal remarks of this sort. Considering them would help one understand certain aspects of the human soul: notably the constellation of longing, pain, pleasure, emotion, hope, and desire.

19 This point is emphasized by at least one other example cited by Aristotle. Consider war. The politician may have to persuade men to sacrifice themselves in war, i.e., he may have to persuade them to risk their individual bodies--and men are concerned with the preservation of their bodies--for the sake of the body politic.

20 How men view politics and the world as a whole will surely effect how they react to misfortunes. Owing to the powerful technology available today, men have rather high expectations regarding what they should get out of life, and they have correspondingly high expectations regarding what problems governments should be able to cope with. Would it not be safe to say that this makes men more prone to anger?

21 At this point it is necessary to give warning about a problem of translation. The Greek nouns philia (commonly translated as "friendship") and philos (commonly translated as "friend") both are etymologically related to the Greek verb phileō, meaning "to love." It would be a grave error for the reader of the Rhetoric to think of these words solely in terms of the connotations derived from their English translations. Today, unfortunately, there is a tendency to think of love as romantic love. The verb phileō should be understood as a love that can be directed at many different things: one can be, to draw examples from the Rhetoric itself, a lover of money, self, honor, reputation, victory, laughter, life, and the gods. When men speak today of friendship, they tend to think only of a small group of intimates. Aristotle thinks of what is now called friendship as one species of a larger genus of friendship. He thinks, anticipating his discussion of the objects of anger, of any group tied together by a common love as a friendship and those who are so tied as friends; and, as well, he thinks that the members of a political community are joined together in a friendly relationship.

22 Theodore Buckley, in his translation of the Rhetoric appends this note to the analysis of anger when philosophia and idea come to light: "[a]lluding to Plato's doctrine of ideas which Aristotle himself so warmly controverted." See Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric and the Poetic of Aristotle, trans. Theodore Buckley, (London: George Bell and

Sons, 1903), p. 109.

23 See also Nicomachean Ethics 1159b25-1161b10.

24 These statements give rise to some speculation about philosophy in the Rhetoric and about philosophy and politics. Philosophy, or at least wisdom, according to Aristotle, stands outside the political realm. He indicates this when he makes two lists of virtues in the discussion of the materials for epideictic rhetoric. In the second list he discards wisdom (cf. 1366b1-3, 1366b9-22; and, as well, 1371b27-28). Nonetheless, philosophers do constitute a friendly community unto themselves, their community being discernible by what philosophers esteem (1367b7-12).

25 This passage is very difficult to translate. See Edward Cope, The "Rhetoric" of Aristotle with a Commentary, ed. John Edwin Sandys, 3 vols., (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1877), 2: 26-27.

26 St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica 1a.2æ.47,3. Thus, a man who is not lacking, though he usually does not pay heed to mockery, will still grow angry. He sees the mockery as an injustice.

27 Political life involves the sharing of goods. There is an inescapable tension in political life, then, because there is contention for those goods, a contention which may give rise to fear and envy (cf. 1381b14, 1382b12-14, 1388a14-17).

28 The distance between the politician and other men becomes apparent when one considers eulogies and funeral orations in times of war. The politicians who make such speeches more than likely do not feel the loss as much as those close to the dead. And they may praise the dead more than they truly deserve: those who feel the loss might think anything less a slight. Consider Lincoln's famed "Gettysburg Address." He perhaps does not speak the entire truth when he states that "[t]he world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here."

29 Leaving the close commentary, bracketed citations refer, once again, to the sections of the text quoted.

30 Of course, it is not at present fashionable to think of justice in these terms. One proponent of this harsher view of punishment, and who is clearly influenced by the teaching of the Rhetoric, is Walter F. Berns. See his For Capital Punishment: Crime and the Morality of the Death Penalty (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1979), pp. 152-155.

31 Men are suspicious of those who employ artful means of persuasion. Nietzsche, in his lectures on rhetoric, sums up this suspicion rather elegantly.

"We call an author, a book, or a style 'rhetorical' when we observe a conscious application of artistic means of speaking; it always implies a gentle reproof. We consider it to be not natural, and as producing the impression of being done purposefully." [Blair, trans., "Nietzsche's Lecture Notes on Rhetoric," p. 107.]

Aristotle stresses that a speech must seem natural and not the product of artifice (1404b8-25, 1408b1-10). Artificiality makes men suspicious. Again, consider Nietzsche's lecture notes:

"The real secret of the rhetorical art is now the prudent relation. . . , of the sincere and the artistic. Whenever the "Naturalness" is imitated nakedly, the artistic sense of the listeners will be offended; in contrast, wherever a purely artistic expression is sought, the moral confidence of the listener will be shaken. It is a playing at the boundary of the aesthetic and moral: any one-sidedness destroys the outcome. The aesthetic fascination must join the moral confidence; but they should not cancel one another out: . . ." [Ibid., p. 115.]

32 In what follows I have benefitted from the examination of notes taken by Dr. Michael Palmer in a class given by Prof. Christopher Bruell on Homer's Iliad at Boston College during 1976.

33 Iliad 2. 196.

34 Ibid., 1. 82.

35 Could Aristotle be thinking of Odysseus? He is included in the analysis of mildness as one who can, at very least, appease anger (cf. Homer Odyssey 14. 29-31, 1380a24-26).

36 Iliad 1. 356.

37 Ibid., 9. 648.

38 Ibid., 9. 225-306, 434-605.

39 Ibid., 9. 624-645.

40 Ibid., 9. 308-323, 356-416, cf. 1.488-492.

41 Ibid., 18. 109

42 We will speak, here, as Aristotle does: about the gods, rather than god. The following analysis may pertain to monotheistic religions; however, it is outside the scope of this thesis to determine whether that is so.

43 Aristotle may take the rhetorical problem Achilles presents seriously. At one point in the text he states the following in regard to finding enthymemes: "[f]or when advising Achilles, praising or blaming, accusing or defending him, we must grasp all that really belongs, or seems to belong to him, in order that we may praise or censure in accordance with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful; defend or accuse, if there is anything just or unjust; advise, if there is anything expedient or harmful" (1396a25-30). Perhaps a careful reading of the Rhetoric discloses how one might persuade Achilles.

44 If one swears an oath at a trial to tell the truth, for instance, one indicates the willingness to accept the ultimate consequences of perjury, either in this life or the afterlife. See Aristotle's discussion of oaths (1377a8-b12, but especially 1377a19-27).

45 Men who have had their religious faith fundamentally shaken by some trying experience, say the horrors of fighting in a war, sometime become emotionally cold. They are often reduced to a simple concern for comfort and cannot be induced to act for the sake of others. This can also happen to men who claim to have no strong faith. In spite of their claim, they may entertain hopes.

46 Jacob Klein claims that "[i]t is pretty certain that, at the age of seventeen or eighteen, Aristotle joined the community founded by Plato outside the walls of Athens and called (from its geographical location) the Academy. He stayed there until Plato died, that is, about twenty years (367-347)." See Klein's "Aristotle, An Introduction," in Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss, ed. Joseph Cropsey (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 50.

47 Bracketed citations in this section refer to the Stephanus pagination of the Apology. The translations cited here are drawn from Thomas G. West, Plato's "Apology of Socrates": An Interpretation, With a New Translation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979). For the sake of clarity, where a reference is made to the Rhetoric it is so indicated.

48 Consider, for instance, A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work (New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1927), pp. 159, 166, and his Socrates (Edinburgh: University Press, 1932), p. 116.

49 A more forthright statement of Socrates' intentions in his last days is found in the writings of Xenophon, another of Socrates' pupils. Beginning his Apology of Socrates he claims that other writers "have not shown clearly that he had now come to the conclusion that for him death was more

to be desired than life; . . ." See Xenophon Apology of Socrates 1. Diogenes Laertius reports that "the Athenians immediately repented of their action, . . ." See The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, trans. C.D. Yonge (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853), p. 73. This may account, in part, for the relative safety enjoyed by the "Socratic school." Ibid., pp. 73-75.

50 See West, Apology, p. 65, note 108.

51 West suggests that Socrates, in the Apology, transforms himself into a new Achilles. Ibid., pp. 151-166.

52 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, Inc., 1966), pp. 684-685, on the virtues of rudeness.

53 See also Xenophon Apology of Socrates 14, 15 on the uproar that Socrates created at his trial.

54 Students of the dialogue should not overlook the fact that Socrates' ability to rouse the anger of the jurors betrays a rather deep understanding of political life. Such an understanding would probably have allowed him to win acquittal if he had so desired. One also begins to wonder if the enigmatic Socrates was ever angry. Consider Plato Republic 536b-c.

55 Though in the Apology Socrates' irony rouses the anger of those he addresses, one should not disregard the possibility that this mode of speech is, nonetheless, polite. It allows a man to speak candidly and still say something palatable to most ears. "A master of irony rarely needs to lie since he can accomplish the just work of lies while still speaking the truth." See Leon H. Craig, "Plato's Apology of Socrates: Defense of an Orthodox Interpretation," Paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Halifax, Nova Scotia, May, 1981, p. 4. The reader of the dialogue may wish to consider the possibility that Socrates is an even harsher critic than he might initially seem.

56 This is emphasized by certain remarks in the analysis of friendship and hate. One might ask whether anger is not like hate. Men hate those whom they take to be their enemies; they are not angry with them. Aristotle reinforces this notion by using the word "enmity" (echthras) interchangeably with the word "hate" (misos). In Greek, echthras is related to echthros, meaning "enemy" (cf. 1381a15-19, 1382a1-5, 1382a16-19, 1362b29-33). The same relationship obtains in English: "enmity" and "enemy" share the same root. Anger, it should be noted, can be a cause of hate (1382a2-3). One who persists in making men angry would eventually come to be regarded as an enemy rather than a friend. Of course, one should not overlook the fact that men, through a sense of

common humanity, will grow angry at the slighting of one to whom they have no connection. It should be added that men's harshest anger is reserved for those to whom they are most closely connected--their family and close friends.

57 Though almost the entire text points to this conclusion, Aristotle makes one statement that is in discord with it. He insists that "whenever you wish to rouse emotion, do not use an enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion or it will be useless; for simultaneous movements drive each other out, the result being their mutual destruction or weakening" (1418a12-15). Aristotle reduces the discord somewhat by suggesting that a speaker should employ maxims (gnōmē), which can have an enthymematic character (cf. 1418a17-21, 1394a25 - 1394b26). Nevertheless, a final and full interpretation of the Rhetoric would demand a resolution of the problems that these statements pose.

58 Here, Aristotle achieves a sort of continuity with his comparison of rhetoric to medicine (iatrikos) (1355b12, 25-29). Both iasis and iatrikos derive from the verb iaomai meaning "to heal." In this context Aristotle exploits another etymological connection that is worth noting. The participial noun pathōn, meaning "one who suffers," and the noun pathos, meaning "emotion," both stem from the verb pascho, "to suffer". Thus, one who experiences anger suffers and is in need of the cure of revenge.

59 An unreasoning appeal to the emotions might involve a situation like the following. A man is angry at another man because he has not returned a favor. An intermediary trying to deflect the anger might speak of some piteous circumstances that afflict the man who owes the favor, but which do not excuse his behaviour. The angry man, feeling pity, might, unreasonably, cease to be angry.

60 Though it must remain unsubstantiated here, it is probably safe to say that an understanding of the other emotions analysed in the Rhetoric would have to proceed from thought about how they, like anger, relate to friendship or love. See St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica 1a.2æ.25,2 and 1a.2æ.27,4.

61 Thucydides offers an interesting depiction of such anger. Pericles, the great Athenian statesman, at the outset of the war with Sparta, suggests a specific policy to deal with the Spartan threat. When the policy "causes" the Athenians pain, Pericles is blamed. He must deliver a speech to placate the angry Athenians. Witness its opening lines.

"Your anger towards me commeth not unlooked for; for the cause of it I know. And I have called this assembly therefore, to remember you, and reprehend you for those things wherein you have either been angry with me, or given way to your adversity,

without reason." [Hobbes, trans., Hobbes's Thucydides, p. 144.]

62 Carnes Lord, "Intention," p. 334.

63 Ibid.

64 Aristotle also makes this point when he first speaks at length about pleasure. He claims that pleasure is a return to a natural state from a state of being disturbed, much like the return from anger to mildness. Immediately thereafter, he speaks of the pleasure of the habitual (1369b33-1370a14). Men's emotions are not altogether natural. They are also the product of nurture, and are a sort of second nature. Men grow angry, for instance, at bad manners, but manners vary from political community to political community.

65 This may explain Aristotle's stress on observation in his definition of rhetoric and at other points in the text (1354a10, 1354b10, 1355a10, 1355b25, 1356a21, 1360a20-21, 1360a30-37). The speaker will have to observe, as well, the emotional peculiarities of the different classes of men discussed in Book Two of the text.

66 See Nicomachean Ethics 1166b30-1167a21.

67 Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning, p. 130.

68 Aristotle seems to acknowledge as much in the Rhetoric. This is rather evident in a contrast of those things in which the deliberative speaker must be versed and the things about which men are concerned (cf. 1359a30-1360b3, 1360b4-1361a14). And, he includes in his catalogue of emotions one that bears some resemblance to friendship, i.e., benevolence (charis). Its essence is providing services. Care would seem especially to illuminate the relationship of political leader to community. Care also involves the easing of longings (1385a21-24). If our characterization of persuasion is correct, a good leader sees to the easing of emotional longings.

69 One must wonder whether this is an entirely satisfying situation for the talented men who do lead. Must such men not occasionally wish to speak with candor about their relation to the political community? To do so without arousing anger they might speak ironically, as philosophers do. At least one student of politics and political philosophy has suspected Abraham Lincoln of speaking in this fashion. Consider Harry Jaffa's remarks in Crisis, p. 3. See also Jacques Barzun's remarks on Lincoln's style, "Lincoln the Writer," in Jacques Barzun On Writing, Editing, and Publishing: Essays Explicative and Horatory (Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 72-73. See note 28, above.

70 In this regard it is interesting to note Thucydides' judgement of Pericles. Pericles was able to control the multitude

"[b]ecause, having gotten his power by no evil arts, he would not humour them in his speeches, but out of his authority durst anger them with contradiction. Therefore, whensoever he saw them out of season insolently bold, he would with his orations put them into a fear; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise erect their spirits and embolden them." [Hobbes, trans., Hobbes's Thucydides, p.148.]

III. CONCLUSION

Emotion and Politics in the Rhetoric

We have examined Aristotle's analysis of anger, turned to Homer's Iliad and Plato's Apology looking for a deeper understanding of anger, and summarized what we learned. It is proper now to retrace our steps. We looked to Aristotle's Rhetoric for his teaching concerning the role of persuasion and rhetoric in politics, and were led to the emotions and anger. The question that must be asked is whether or not this focused study of what Aristotle takes to be an important example of emotion is, in fact, central to understanding the Rhetoric and central to understanding politics and persuasion and rhetoric.

Even the brief study attempted here prompts one to answer this question with an almost unqualified affirmation. The impetus that led to this consideration of anger was what appeared to be equivocation on Aristotle's part regarding the place of the emotions in the Rhetoric. From a cursory reading of the text it is not clear how one is to understand Aristotle's division of the means of persuasion. He states there are three: persuasion through character, persuasion through the arousal of emotion, and persuasion through the speech itself. That strict division underwent qualification, and the study of anger was meant to somehow provide clarification. Studying the analysis we find that the division collapses, in a way. It becomes clear that the

means of persuasion must be understood through a general understanding of emotion. It also becomes clear that rhetorical speech is speech that is necessarily, though Aristotle is reluctant to state it in a forthright manner, directed at men's emotions.'

Studying Aristotle's analysis of anger one is immersed, rather thoroughly, in political psychology of a high order. From that study one begins to fathom the psychological nature of men, and therewith the psychological nature of their ties to one another in political communities. To restate the matter in the briefest compass: man's political nature and his emotional nature, at least as one is led to see them in the analysis of anger, are two sides of the same coin. The analysis of anger, especially when contrasted with the analysis of friendship, reveals that politics is firmly based in an emotional attachment and dependence upon others, which is the friendship of the political community, and which gives rise to anger and, perhaps as well, the other emotions Aristotle chooses to enumerate in Book Two of the text.²

One, thus, begins to appreciate the centrality of the emotions in the Rhetoric. The persuasive speaker must through his speech enter into the emotional realm of politics. To use the terms of Aristotle's original taxonomy of the means of persuasion, the speaker must persuade through character, and so engage the trust of his audience. He must, for his hearers to trust him, appear as a friend,

i.e., as one of the political community. He must, so as to guide their emotions with reason, recognize that the reasoning he employs is to some extent circumscribed by both the general and the particular political character of the audience he addresses.

Aristotle's teaching on these matters sheds some light on a statement which he makes near the beginning of the text. He observes that "the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites" (1355a21-22). A speaker must surely take cognizance of what a community regards as just. And, in some sense, a speaker, if he is to be the powerful speaker Aristotle envisions, must not try to subvert the truth to any great degree. A speaker must reason with men's emotions. If his reasoning does not accord with the facts of the matter, it is doubtful whether he would succeed. The true and the just resist verbal manipulation, and the reader of the Rhetoric comes to realize that this is the essence of powerful speech (1355a36-38).

Following through Aristotle's teaching in the Rhetoric, it is possible to understand why he likens rhetoric to medicine (1355b8-14, 1356b28-34). The art of medicine is the power to do good or ill to bodies; nonetheless, it takes its bearings, and must do so, from the fulfilled bodily condition we recognize as health. The practice of medicine is necessarily informed by that fulfilled condition. For a man to have power over bodies, he must know about health and what contributes to it. Aristotle prescribes that a similar

relation inform rhetorical practice. The art of rhetoric may be employed, like medicine, for good or ill (1355b2-7). Though it may not immediately be apparent to those who are attracted to acquiring the power of speech, rhetoric too must take its bearings from something like health: political health, the health of the body politic.

One's immersion in the political psychology of the Rhetoric, then, is bound to affect, perhaps profoundly, one's view of politics, even to the point of influencing how one acts politically. What Aristotle achieves, and he doubtless intends this, is to instill in his reader a respect for the political life. Whether one looks to the Rhetoric from a practical or a theoretical standpoint, one seeks a teaching about rhetoric that is more powerful than that of the technologists whom Aristotle criticizes. The source of that power is the recognition that any community has a certain integrity. A political community thrives because of its shared view of good and bad, and of justice. It is the friendship that stems from this "shared view," as we saw, that leads men to regard with suspicion outsiders and strangers, and ultimately to protect their own. In order to persuade, a speaker must accord this partiality of communities a certain precedence.

Aristotle's teaching garnered from the Rhetoric has an effect on its readers that they may not have anticipated. The realization that political life is inherently emotional influences one's political action. The practical man gains

knowledge that aids him to persuade, but it is acquired at the cost of any thought of powerful manipulation in the political realm. He must eventually bow to the fact that the protectiveness of a community will limit what may be achieved through speech. Thus, Aristotle's teaching moderates the extravagant designs those who seek the power of speech might entertain.

But the theoretical man may also be influenced by Aristotle's account of rhetoric. He gains knowledge of persuasion's role in politics. He may realize that politics is an emotional business, and moreover, that healthy politics demands that politicians guide the emotions of other men. That is to say, healthy politics demands that politicians learn the art of rhetoric--the art of persuasive speaking. Aristotle, thus, not only writes a book from which men can learn something of rhetoric, he also writes a book which demonstrates the need for persuasion in political life and ultimately the need for politicians to learn rhetoric. The emphasis on the emotions, and anger in particular, forces anyone interested in politics from a theoretical standpoint to a conclusion about practical politics and, as well, a conclusion about the relation of theory to practice. If healthy politics somehow depends on the cultivation of the art of rhetoric, then it seems the duty of the theoretical man to maintain a lively interest in rhetoric.

Rhetoric, Political Science, and Aristotle's Rhetoric

This said regarding the teaching of Aristotle's Rhetoric, we may return to the observations and questions that occasioned our interest in that text. We began by observing that the once dominant liberal education, which included the study of the art of rhetoric, has been eclipsed by the specialized education of the sciences and the social sciences, and with the further observation that the liberal art of rhetoric and rhetorical study in general are no longer held in any estimation. We asked whether persuasion and rhetoric were necessary aspects of politics, and whether political scientists should maintain an interest in rhetoric. The examination of the Rhetoric undertaken here, despite its narrow, focused character, moves one to utter a "yes." Why? To answer that question we will employ the writings of a man who understood the necessity for rhetoric. John Quincy Adams, prior to becoming president of the United States, lectured at Harvard University on rhetoric and oratory. In his published lectures he says this of the Rhetoric:

One entire book of the three, which contain the rhetorical system of Aristotle, is devoted to the passions [what we have here called the emotions]. He selects from the whole mass of habits and affections, which hold dominion over the hearts of men, a certain number, which he comprises under the general denomination of oratorical passions, or passions which are peculiarly susceptible of being operated upon by a public speaker. To each of these he allots a distinct chapter, in which he successively analyzes the passion itself, the classes of men, who are most liable to be stimulated by it, and the manner in which it may be excited. This book is one of the profoundest and most

ingenious treatises upon human nature, that ever issued from the pen of man. It searches the issues of the heart with a keenness of penetration, which nothing can surpass, unless it be its severity. There is nothing satirical in his manner, and his obvious intention is merely as an artist to expose the mechanism of man; to discover the moral nerves and sinews, which are the peculiar organs of sensation; to dissect the internal structure, and expose the most hidden chambers of the tenement to our view.³

We utter that "yes" because the Rhetoric is a profound book about human nature. The study of the emotional psychology in Aristotle's Rhetoric is the beginning of a stern education about human nature and the "real world" of politics. Through that study one begins to appreciate the difficulties that political leaders face in achieving concerted action in a political community, and one also begins to appreciate the crucial role a politician's speeches may play in any political "chain of events." Good leadership depends, and one is tempted to add this is especially the case in today's democracies, on the ability to persuade, and as a consequence depends on politicians' receiving a rhetorical education.

The look into political psychology that is the product of an examination of the analysis of anger in the Rhetoric shows that modern political scientists are, in certain respects, negligent. The objective method employed by many modern political scientists leads them away from a consideration of important aspects of politics. They neglect the sort of study undertaken in a book like the Rhetoric. While not wanting, as was stressed at the outset of this

thesis, to call into question the worth of modern political science in its entirety, one may say that Aristotle's Rhetoric reveals that it suffers from a certain defect. Standing at a distance from politics, a distance dictated by a questionable method, the political scientists' appreciation of politics as a whole is often only an appreciation of modern liberal-democratic politics, and even then, only in a limited respect, for many of them uncritically accept certain of the opinions that animate liberal-democratic politics.

This means an acceptance of what might best be called "rational egalitarianism." Today an inordinate emphasis is placed on men's power of reason, the assumption of liberal-democratic politics being that the greater number of men are capable of making sober political decisions. At the same time, this "rationalism" leads to a certain view of emotion. Emotion is debunked, along with associated "phenomena" such as patriotism and loyalty, in the name of reason.⁴ Aristotle shows those who are willing to study his text a somewhat different conclusion about emotion and politics. When Aristotle treats of rhetoric, he looks with a keen eye and unflinching nerve at the hard facts of political life. He traces men's immediate and pressing concerns to their emotional roots and suggests in a general way that decent, healthy political life springs from those roots. He proves that the art of rhetoric is an art politicians should learn. It is a lesson such as this that

is simply lost on most of today's political scientists.

Thus, it is also clear, upon studying the Rhetoric, that the excesses of modern political science must be corrected. How might this be accomplished? The study of some of the more important texts of the rhetorical tradition would be a beginning. A more feasible solution, however, would be for students of political science to study the speeches of politicians and statesmen. Study of such speeches would foster an appreciation of the issues of politics, not to mention an appreciation of the difficulties men face in moving men to concerted action.⁵ This would allow theoretical men to make a more positive contribution to political practice.

Aristotle's Rhetoric, thus, alerts us to the danger of the disproportionate attention of our age to the specialized knowledge of the sciences and social sciences. That attention issues in a disregard for the seemingly useful and edifying study of at least one of the liberal arts: the art of rhetoric. A liberal education has all but disappeared from our institutes of higher learning. Yet, it is still possible to acquire something like a liberal education through the careful study of books like the Rhetoric. Studying the Rhetoric, one is certainly denied the pleasure of, say, leading a breakthrough in the scientific study of politics. It is true that one is denied such a pleasure, but it is equally true that one who seriously reads the Rhetoric is accorded the pleasure of rediscovering a persuasive view

of politics that has been obscured by the opinions of this age.

Notes

1 Having seen again and again that Aristotle is cautious in the elaboration of his teaching, it is perhaps fitting, now, to speculate about his reasons for his being cautious. In terms of the practical teaching of the Rhetoric, his reconditeness at least ensures that one must engage in a certain intellectual exercise in order to secure the power of rhetorical speech. In terms of the text's theoretical teaching his reconditeness may be explained by the delicacy of the matters he treats in order to provide his reader with a full picture of anger: for instance, the relation of anger to a belief in gods--for speculation about the nature of gods was not always looked upon with approval. Thinking specifically of the emotions, one should not overlook the possibility that Aristotle wished to place some distance between himself and the technologists, who, in their own way, thought that emotion was crucial to persuasion.

2 We should note that there are emotions or, more accurately, passions that are not necessarily related to life in a political community. Indeed, there are passions that, if activated, may even divorce one from politics, e.g., a passion for learning (1371a31-34, 1371b4-10, 1372a4). This passion is found in all men to some degree. See the oft-quoted opening line of the Metaphysics 980a22: "[a]ll men by nature desire to know." Aristotle observes that men take pleasure in "easy learning" and that this is especially the product of metaphor (1409b1-6, 1410b10-27). A rhetorical speaker makes use of this passion by "educating" as he speaks.

3 John Quincy Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, 2 vols., (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), 2: 368-369.

4 Arnhart, speaking of his turn to the Rhetoric, asserts that the modern absorption with scientific demonstration leads to the notion that politics is somehow an irrational enterprise, that men cannot reason about political action. Thus, he looks to Aristotle's treatment of rhetoric, as a remedy: Aristotle's rhetorical teaching stresses reasoning about political action, and stresses reasoning with people's emotions. See, Aristotle on Political Reasoning, p. 4. Arnhart's observations surely have some purchase on the reality of political life today. Yet, one must wonder if his emphasis is not somehow misplaced. Political groups such as feminists, environmentalists, and pacifists all think of themselves as the very model of reason. Arnhart's remarks should be held in counter-poise with those made by C. S. Lewis in his Abolition of Man and those made by Richard M. Weaver in Language is Sermonic. Lewis claims, and provides clear evidence, that reason and science do effect politics.

He maintains that this introduces a reasonable standard where it has no proper place. The modern absorption with science produces men of "cold rationality" who are, to use his beautiful phrase, "men without chests." (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947; Macmillan Paperback Edition, 1965), pp. 13-35. Weaver makes a similar case and speaks specifically about rhetoric. He maintains that as the scientific impulse spread

"it was the emotional and subjective components of [man's] being that chiefly came under criticism, ... Emotion and logic or science do not consort; the latter must be objective, faithful to what is out there in the public domain and comformable to the processes of reason." [Language is Sermonic, p. 205.]

He adds that

"[u]nder the force of this narrow reasoning, it was natural that rhetoric should pass from a status in which it was regarded as of questionable worth to a still lower one in which it was positively condemned." [Ibid.]

Both Lewis and Weaver argue that we do not require a return to reason, but a return to emotion. Might not a renewed interest in books such as the Rhetoric teach men how to reconstruct or revitalize the emotional horizon seemingly so essential to political life?

5 Consider Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided, pp. 2-3, and as well, Peter Augustine Lawler, "Rhetoric as the Foundation for a Political Education," News for Teachers of Political Science 37 (1983): 4-5.

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